台灣金融控股公司經營主體、多角化經營與經營效率之關聯性研究－兼論公司治理之角色

Abstract

本研究首先採用資料包絡分析法分析台灣2003-2010年14家金融控股公 司的經營效率，相對營運效率值之計算係採用Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978)的DEA-CCR模式。研究結果發現14家金融控股公司之經營效率平均約有42%的改善空間，而經營無效率之主因係來自純技術無效率與規模無效率。其次，針對影響金融控股公司經營效率之因素進行分析，結果顯示金融控股公司以銀行業為經營主體者，其經營效率較以壽險業與證券業為經營主體者為差，而經營主體營收占整體營收比重愈高者，其經營效率愈佳;在2008年金融風暴前，以銀行業及證券業為經營主體之金控公司多角化經營程度與其經營效率呈顯著正向關係，但在2008年金融風暴後，多角化經營程度與金控公司經營效率之正向關係逐漸消失。本研究再進一步針對公司治理之角色進行分析，發現在2008年金融風暴前，董事會規模對多角化經營程度與經營效率之關係具有調節效果，但在2008年金融風暴後，董事會規模對多角化經營程度與經營效率之關係具有正向影響。而官股持股比率之結果正好相反。

This study investigates the operational efficiency of 14 financial holding companies operating in Taiwan from 2003 to 2010. The DEA-CCR method developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) is used to measure the relative operational efficiency of financial holding companies. The empirical results indicate that a 42% improvement in the operational efficiency of the companies is necessary in the study sample. The main reasons for operating inefficiency were pure technical and scale inefficiencies. This study also examines the determinants of the operational efficiency of financial holding companies. The results show that financial holding companies with a major business unit, most often a bank, have lower operational efficiency in comparison with life insurance and securities firms. The ratio of revenues from a major business unit to total revenues from the financial holding company positively and significantly affects operational efficiency. The relationship between the diversification level and operational efficiency is significantly positive for the period before the 2008 financial crisis and significantly negative for the period after the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, this study analyzes the role of corporate governance and finds that for the period before the 2008 crisis, board size moderates the relationship between diversification level and operational efficiency. However, for the period after the 2008 crisis, board size positively affects the relationship between diversification level and operational efficiency. However, the shareholding ratio of government has the opposite results in terms of board size.