The Impact of Controlling Shareholders on the Executive Compensation

Abstract

本文主要探討考慮控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。本文延續Shaw and Zhang (2010)的研究，加入控制股東的影響，選取2006 年至2015 年台灣經濟新報資料，檢測控制股東對於薪酬績效敏感性的影響。結果發現: (1)在不考慮控制股東的影響時，擁有較佳的公司治理機制的公司能夠提高薪酬績效敏感性；(2)考慮控制股東的影響後，與董事會關聯程度低的控制股東存在正向的誘因效果，因此控制股東與董事會關聯程度低可視為公司有較佳的公司治理品質。本文結論認為探討公司治理機制對於薪酬績效敏感性時，必須考慮控制股東及其與董事會關聯性的影響，此研究結論同時也是本文主要研究貢獻。

This paper primarily investigates the effectiveness of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of firms with controlling shareholders. Examining Taiwanese firms public listed from 2006 to 2015, we find two main results. (1) Good corporate governance enhances the sensitivity of pay to performance in general case. (2) When there exist controlling shareholders, the controlling shareholders with lower affiliation with the board of directors can provide more incentive effect on PPS. In particular, the effect of controlling shareholders on PPS changes is subject to firm size and environmental shocks. The results suggest that ownership structure and its affiliation with the board are essential to the effect of compensation that however not yet documented in the related literature.