Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/117432
題名: 行政部門的資訊優勢對立法的影響力—以第八屆立法院為例
The Informational Advantage of the Executive Branch in the Legislation: The Case of Legislative Yuan from 2012 to 2016
作者: 宋至晟
Sung, Chih Cheng
貢獻者: 盛杏湲
宋至晟
Sung, Chih Cheng
關鍵詞: 行政部門
資訊優勢
立法影響力
委員會資深程度
否決者
Executive branch
Informational advantage
Legislative influence
Seniority of committee member
Veto player
日期: 2018
上傳時間: 1-Jun-2018
摘要: 本研究以行政院在立法上的影響力為焦點。筆者認為立法委員有動機成就好的立法,在行政部門的資訊優勢下,立法委員會傾向接受行政部門陳述的觀點,並導致行政部門對於立法產生相當突出的影響力。本文先以深入訪談法瞭解與佐證行政部門的資訊優勢確實存在且影響卓越,再以內容分析法分析行政部門的態度對於立法結果的影響。\n 研究結果發現,行政部門對於立法院的優勢呈現在其對於資訊的壟斷、行政執行經驗及專業程度等優勢上。另外,經驗分析顯示,行政部門的意見確實對於重大法案的結果,具有相當重要的影響,筆者認為,行政部門的立法影響力,已近乎於否決者的角色。換句話說,若一個法案想要順利通過,行政部門的肯認,或至少不表達反對,已成為立法成功的必要條件之一。\n 最後,過去相關的文獻曾指出一個提案的提案者黨籍、是否為委員會成員及召集委員、有無經過黨團協商等因素,皆與該提案能否順利三讀通過有關。本文的經驗數據也呈現相似的結論。更進一步地,本研究發現,在考量上述因素後,行政部門對於立法的影響依然最為深遠。
This thesis focuses on the legislative influence of the Executive Yuan. The author believes the legislators are motivated to achieve the high quality of law-making. Because of the informational advantage of the executive branch, the legislators tend to accept the perspective made by the executive branch, which leads to the significant influence in the Legislation. First, this paper uses intensive interviews to find out and justify the existence of the informational advantage of the executive branch and its profound influence on the legislation. Furthermore, by using content analysis, this paper intends to dissect what the attitude of the executive branch has an effect on the legislative outcomes.\n The result revealed the relative advantage of the executive branch over the Legislative Yuan lies on the informational monopoly, administrative executive experiences and the high-level of professionalization. Additionally, the empirical analysis shows the executive branch does have the significant impact on the outcomes of major bills. In the author’s opinion, the effect of the executive branch has come close to the role of veto players. In other words, the approval of the executive branch, or at least the attitude of non-objection, has become one of the necessary conditions for successful legislation.\n Finally, relevant literature reviews have pointed out several factors that are associated with whether a bill can pass or not. Those factors include the partisanship, committee member, committee chair and the process of party negotiation, etc. The empirical analysis of this thesis disclosed similar conclusions as other literature reviews. Further, this thesis discovers, by taking the above factors into consideration, the executive branch plays the most significant role in the legislation.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
政治學系
104252004
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104252004
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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