網路戰爭與嚇阻 : 以美國與俄羅斯為例

Abstract

本研究檢視了美國和俄羅斯的網路運作。透過檢視這兩個不同的國家以及與他們網路發展相關的個案，研究者舉例說明威嚇的概念是如何在網路領域中發展起來的。目前各國在網路空間的威嚇上面臨的主要問題是歸因問題，知道有哪些人參與網路運作即屬歸因問題。然而，透過約瑟夫·奈爾（Joseph Nye）對網路運作和威嚇的方法，對美國和俄羅斯的網路行動進行分析，我以實例說明未來眾所周知的攻擊性優勢可能會減少。具體而言，除了組織完善且資金充足的國家之外，其他參與者可能會發現網路運作成本太高、風險太大。這不僅是因為改進了歸因技術，而且還因為各國在網路防禦方面有所改善，並普遍改善了網路衛生。此外，有關網路的雙邊與多邊協議的嘗試可能會進一步減少網路運作攻擊，或至少，減少各種官方情報單位範圍以外的行動。最終，人們會發現與20世紀初的空軍戰力和20世紀中期的核武器類似，各國可能會開發有形和無形的方法來應對網路作戰的威脅。但是，在現今的強權國家如美國，接受有關網路之具有法律約束力的多邊條約和協議的情況下，俄羅斯等其他國家也不願意失去在使混合作戰行動中可行的重要角色。在未來，關於網路的爭論與發展可能涉及兩個明確的陣營，即指那些支持現狀和所謂修正主義的陣營。

This thesis examines the cyber operations of the United States and Russia. By examining these two separate states, and the individual cases related to their cyber development, I illustrate how notions of deterrence are developing in the cyber realm. A major problem currently facing states with regards to deterrence in cyber space, is attribution. Knowing who engages in what cyber operations is attribution. However, through analysis of United States and Russian cyber operations through the lens of Joseph Nye`s approach to cyber operations and deterrence I illustrate that in the future the well known offensive advantage may lessen. Specifically, those actors besides well-organized and sufficiently funded nation-states may find cyber operations too costly and too risky to be of value. This is as a result of not just improved attribution technology, but also due to improvements in nation-state`s cyber defensive postures and generally improved cyber hygiene. Further, attempts at bilateral and multilateral agreements with regards to cyber may further reduce operations; or at least, reduce operations outside of the purview of the intelligence services of various official actors. Ultimately, it is found that, in similar fashion to air power in the early 20th century and nuclear weapons in the middle of the 20th century, states will likely develop both tangible and intangible approaches to dealing with the threat of cyber operations. However, where status-quo powers like the United States embrace the adoption of legally binding multilateral treaties and agreements regarding cyber, other states such as Russia would rather not potentially lose an important part of what makes Hybrid Warfare operations viable. The debates on and development of cyber may involve two clear camps in the future, those supporting the status-quo and so-called revisionist powers.