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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118967| 題名: | 中國風電發展的地方政府行為分析：以內蒙古自治區為例 The Analysis of Local Government Behavior in China’s Wind Power Development: A Case Study of Inner Mongolia |
作者: | 王婉臻 Wang, Wan-Jen |
貢獻者: | 王振寰 Wang, Jenn-Hwan 王婉臻 Wang, Wan-Jen |
關鍵詞: | 中國風電 地方政府 環境綑綁的經濟利益 棄風 Wind power in China Local government Environmentally bundled economic interest Wind curtailment |
日期: | 2018 | 上傳時間: | 27-七月-2018 | 摘要: | 全球氣候變化正深刻地影響著人類生存和發展，為了改善國內環境的惡化和回應國際減碳的壓力，中國政府積極將環境保護的議題納入新的執政綱領之中，並大力發展風力發電為主的清潔能源以降低長期依賴燃煤發電的能源結構。儘管中國風電的裝機容量已傲居全球，但在快速發展的同時也面臨了各種問題和困境。有別於以往的研究多關注於中央政府的作為卻忽略了地方政府執行政策的角色與職能，本文主要以「地方政府」作為研究主體，透過內蒙古的研究個案發現：地方政府會將中央環境政策的要求納入地方發展的脈絡中，利用「環境政策」和「土地資源」去綁住發電集團到當地建設風電場，再透過建立起來的「風電規模」和「產業政策」對風電設備商進行招商引資，進而在當地發展出一條完整的風電產業鏈。此舉既滿足中央以風電作為環境改善的目標，又能為地方帶來經濟增長和財政收入，與「環境綑綁的經濟利益」觀點相符。然而，地方政府盲目擴張風電場的結果，不僅造成電源建設與電網輸送之間的脫節，不斷加劇的棄風問題也導致風電無法獲得有效利用。 Global climate change has been profoundly affecting the survival and development of humankind. In order to improve the deterioration of the domestic environment and respond to the pressure of international carbon reduction, the Chinese government has actively incorporated environment issues into the new policy agenda. Furthermore, the government has also vigorously developed wind power generation to reduce long-term dependence on coal-fired power generation structure. Although China has led the world in wind power installation, it has faced a myriad of problems and difficulties while it is rapidly developing. Different from most previous studies focusing on the central government’s actions and ignoring the role and functions of the local government’s implementation of policies, this paper aims at “local government” as the research subject. Through the case study of Inner Mongolia, this paper finds that the local government has subsumed the requirements of environmental policies into the context of local development. The local government utilizes “environmental policies” and “land resources” to tie the generation companies to the local construction of wind farms, and then through the established “wind power scale” and “industrial policies” to attract the investment of wind power equipment suppliers. The introduction of investment has further formed a complete industrial chain in the local area. This act not only satisfies the central government’s goal of utilizing wind power as environment betterment, but also brings economic growth and tax revenue to the local economy, which is in line with the “environmentally bundled economic interest.” However, the result of random expansion of wind farms by the local government of Inner Mongolia has not only caused a mismatch between power supply construction and grid transmission, but also led to the increasing problem of wind curtailment. |
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The razor`s edge: Distortions and incremental reform in the People`s Republic of China. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1091-1135. | 描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 國家發展研究所 104261021 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104261021 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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