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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120280| 題名: | 中國政經體制及國有企業改革之研究— 國家資本主義多樣性理論之分析 Study on China`s political and economic institution and state-owned enterprise reform: a varieties of state capitalism approach |
作者: | 廖修武 Liao, Shiu-Wu |
貢獻者: | 吳德美 Wu, Te-Mei 廖修武 Liao, Shiu-Wu |
關鍵詞: | 國有企業 國家資本主義 中國研究 代理人理論 國家資本主義多樣性理論 State-owned enterprise State capitalism China studies Agency theory Varieties of state capitalism |
日期: | 2018 | 上傳時間: | 1-Oct-2018 | 摘要: | 本研究之目的，在於探討中國在經過數十年的改革開放後，究竟演化出何種政經體制。本研究首先針對過去研究中國政經體制的學術文獻進行分析，發現中國目前之政經體制，無論是資本主義、社會主義市場經濟抑或是發展型國家、資本主義多樣性等理論進行解釋均有所不足。是以，本研究提出應以學界近期提出之國家資本主義對中國大陸之政治經濟體制進行描述與分類，並使用以巴西的國有企業改革經驗所發展出的國家資本主義多樣性理論對中國進行實證研究。發現中國之政經體制現況，尤其是國有企業的行為，雖大致符合國家資本主義多樣性理論之解釋，但在中國政府可以操控市場的情況下，仍有部分現象與該理論之預期相違，顯示該理論框架仍有不足之處。 The purpose of this thesis is to explore what kind of political and economic institution China has evolved after decades of the beginning of Chinese economic reform in 1980s.First, we analyzes those literature on China`s political and economic institution and finds that China`s current political and economic institution and phenomenon, can not be explained by past mainstream theories of china studies, including capitalism, socialist market economy ,developmental state or varieties of capitalism. Therefore, this thesis proposes to describe and classify the political and economic institution of China by the state capitalism recently proposed by the academic community, and empirical research on China using the varieties of state capitalism theory developed by Brazilian state-owned enterprise reform experience.\r\nIt is found that the current situation of China`s political and economic institution and phenomenon, especially the behavior of state-owned enterprises, is roughly in line with the interpretation of the varieties of state capitalism theory. However, in the case that the Chinese government can interfere the market effectively, there are still some phenomena that are contrary to the theory`s expectations. The framework of this theory still has shortcomings. |
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State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies. China Journal of Accounting Research, 6(2), 75-87.\r\n專書論文\r\nChu, Y. W., & So, A. Y. (2010). State neoliberalism: The Chinese road to capitalism. In Chinese capitalisms (pp. 46-72). Palgrave Macmillan, London.\r\nNaughton, B. (2015). The transformation of the state sector: SASAC, the market economy, and the new national champions. State capitalism, institutional adaptation, and the Chinese miracle, 46-71.\r\nSzelényi, Ivan. (2010). Capitalism in China? Comparative Perspectives Chinese Capitalisms (pp. 199-223): Springer. | 描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 國家發展研究所 101261011 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101261011 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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