Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/121147
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | 經濟系 | |
dc.creator | Shoou-RongTsai | en_US |
dc.creator | Pan-LongTsai | en_US |
dc.creator | 翁永和 | zh_TW |
dc.creator | YunghoWeng | en_US |
dc.date | 2018-11 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-28T09:42:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-28T09:42:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018-11-28T09:42:30Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/121147 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Using simple linear demand functions, we have shown that in the thircd market strategic trade policy model there cannot be Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot competition in equilibrium if the two firms choose strategic variables endogenously. More importantly, knowing that the firms will react to its policy in choosing their strategic variables, the government can indeed provide export subsidies to the home firm to maximize the home social welfare if some moderate, reasonable constraints are satisfied. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 58619 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.relation | International Review of Economics and Finance, Volume 58, Pages 676-682 | |
dc.subject | Strategic trade policy; Endogenous strategic variable; Brander-Spencer model | en_US |
dc.title | Endogenous Strategic Trade Policy: The Case of the Third Market Model | en_US |
dc.type | article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.iref.2018.07.007 | |
dc.doi.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2018.07.007 | |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairetype | article | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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