霍布斯論自然法與政治義務

Abstract

In this essay I examine the role and function of Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature in his political theory by reconsidering the basis of his concept of political obligation. This essay takes issue with common readings of Hobbes which either considers Hobbesian laws of nature is nothing but counsels from reason(which provides no obligations) or mere hypothetical imperatives(which at best justify prudential obligations). To argue against the common readings, this essay argues that Hobbesian laws of nature is essential to understanding Hobbes’s concept of political obligation because they provide some kind of natural duty by which an effective “reasonable consent” can be defined. In addition, to argue against the view of de facto theory, I argue that both “Consent” and “Safety” are the necessary conditions of Hobbesian conception of political obligation.

本文處理的是霍布斯式自然法在其政治理論中的角色與作用，霍布斯自然法向來是其政治理論中較被忽略之處，因通常認為霍布斯為證成其絕對主權而弱化傳統自然法權威，但弔詭的是霍布斯式自然法卻又似乎具相當的規範效力，而因為兩種進路均有相當文本證據支持所以形成某種「詮釋的兩難」。為探討自然法在霍布斯政治理論中的角色與功能，本文將從霍布斯政治義務觀切入，探討自然法與其政治義務之關聯。本文主要論證兩點：首先，本文對當代主流事實權威論對於霍布斯之政治義務的詮釋提出質疑，此一主流論點認為霍布斯式自然法並無重要性，本文將論證若認真考量霍布斯的自然法論述，將對其政治義務觀有更完整的理解；具體而言，藉由探討自然法的角色，本文論證霍布斯的政治義務並非僅僅建立在「事實的強力」或「同意」之上，而必須考慮到自然法所給出的限制，因此可以說政治義務建立在「理性的同意」上。