反思限制有線電視系統經營者併購新聞頻道之管制政策

Abstract

隨著數位匯流、資源共享以及高獲利等因素，加上為了集中資源以面對來自國際間的競爭，近幾年來台灣媒體併購風潮未曾停止。由於我國有線系統經營者多為獨占經營，而各系統業者又多隸屬於MSO；至於新聞頻道向為民眾獲取資訊最主要的管道，因此近幾年的併購案，只要涉及有線電視系統經營者併購/新設新聞頻道的議題，主管機關多是採取禁止結合的結構管制手段。然而目前作法卻產生偏重結構管制、欠缺一致性標準，以及未因應個案調整管制密度等問題。\n經分析禁止有線電視系統經營者併購新聞頻道的背景、可能會產生的問題、主管機關的決策考量與管制重點得知，由於系統業者可能藉其所擁有之市場力量導致差別待遇以及產生內容壟斷，因此主管機關在促進公平競爭與維護公共利益的考量下，分別針對個案做出決議及相關附加條件。然而，細究不同個案審議過程與結果，卻發現管制重點不一的問題。\n本研究爰針對政策設計時應考量面向及未來做法進行深度訪談，針對未來管制作法提出包括：主管機關應針對收視市場的影響力進行縝密之調查，具體敘明禁止結合標準訂定之依據；規管重點應思考如何避免系統業者透過頻道上下架或授權與否的權力來影響新聞頻道的言論以及公平競爭，以及當整合案有礙公平競爭應予否准；至於許可整合之行為管制面向應著重在市場主導者義務之建議，才能符合主管機關監理能量與切合市場現存問題。同時就本研究關心議題相關面向提出主管機關應致力營造公平競爭的環境，同時加強相關數據的解讀分析能力等配套之建議，以期達到促進公平競爭、維護公共利益與兼顧產業發展的目的。

Merger and acquisition(M&A) activity in Taiwan’s media industry has picked up momentum in the context of digital convergence and sharing economy. A cable TV operator usually holds a monopoly in the local market and is affiliated to a multiple system operator (MSO). The news channels carried by the cable TV operators are the main information sources. Therefore, the regulatory authority in Taiwan tends to take structural regulation approach to forbid the M&A activities when it comes to cable television systems and news broadcasting companies. For this reason, there are regulatory biases such as a lack of coherent standards and tailor-made regulatory repertoire.\nAfter reviewing the backdrop of domestic merger and acquisition of cable television systems and news broadcasting companies, relevant issues and the regulatory authority’s theory and practice of media policy and regulation, this thesis hypothesizes that in consideration of facilitating fair market competition and protecting public interest, the regulatory authority makes situated and conditional decisions to restrict the abuse of monopoly power and the content market failure followed. However, by going through the considering process of several M&A cases, the preliminary finding is focused on the regulatory biases and the problems caused.\nIn the aim to provide policy suggestion for future media regulation, a qualitative research method with in-depth interviews was employed in this research. This thesis proposes the following major findings: 1) the regulatory authority is advised to conduct intensive survey on the influence of competitors in audience marketplace and specify criteria and indicators on how the M&A deals would be considered; 2) When the M&A activity is the cause or effect of the abuse of media monopoly power (e.g. cable TV operator or MSO arbitrarily decides which channels can be televised or authorized by their own broadcasting system and causes media content market failure.) and the content market failure followed, the application of such deals should be overruled; 3) from the perspective of behavioral regulation, the application of M&A deal has the chance to be approved only if the obligation of market leader assured and the purpose of sound regulation achieved.\nAs far as the governmental goal of facilitating fair competition, protecting public interest and stimulating media industry development is concerned, the thesis suggests that the regulatory authority put in much effort to create and reinforce a fairly competitive policy environment and enhance the dexterity in reading and analyzing data and information.