威權環境主義流域治理之機制與限制：以中國昆明河長制度為例

Abstract

隨著高度的都市化與經濟發展，中國的水污染問題日益嚴峻。為解決此一難題，中國地方政府近年來採取一名為「河長制」的流域治理模式，即將特定河流的主流與支流，指派由領導黨政幹部做為「河長（或段長）」，負責改善河流的水質，而水污染治理的結果，會納入黨政幹部的年度政績考核評分。我們認為中國河長制之制度設計，體現威權環境主義（authoritarianenvironmentalism）的核心邏輯，將治水責任改為透過黨政體系發包流域治理責任、水質改善納入政績競賽、轄區界線設置水質監測點落實考核。本文以昆明滇池做為研究個案，探討河長制對流域治理動員地方黨政領導幹部之制度運作，說明河長制雖然短期對水質改善有所成效，然而長期卻以大量迫遷與土地貪污等高額社會與政治成本作為代價。

Since 1978, China has witnessed rapid urbanization and economic development at the cost of environmental degradation. In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party（CCP）initiated the river leader system, through which local leading cadres are assigned to be responsible for water quality of certain rivers. In this system, results of river quality control are connected to cadres’ political promotion. I argue that the river leader system presents certain characteristics of authoritarian environmentalism under CCP, including（1）hierarchical operation through subcontracting performance, （2）inter-jurisdiction competition motivating local leaders, and（3）quotaoriented territorial management. The case of river leader for Dian Lake, Kunming of Yunnan province, is empirically examined to discuss detailed mechanisms and effectiveness of the river leaders system. Along with the improved water quality of Dian Lake is a forced displacement and production of alleged land-related corruption. I conclude that the river leader system in China may enhance better environment for the short term at the expense of social and political unsustainability in the long run.