中國大陸敵意併購防禦策略案例研究與法制探討

Abstract

隨著商業的熾熱競爭，全球併購浪潮日趨激烈，而敵意併購向來是併購議題的熱門焦點。在國際化與經濟自由化的發展之下，企業提升競爭力，促進效率經營、擴大市場占有率及提升產業競爭力，勢必將透過企業併購而加速產業的進步發展，大陸因受到國家政策支持，在2016年已經加速了企業併購的腳步。因敵意併購是在未經目標公司經營者同意下即強行進行併購，且併購後常導致目標公司經營權變更，故目標公司董事會於面臨敵意併購時，通常會採取防衛措施以抵抗敵意併購，且雙方攻擊防禦的過程中往往演變為經營權惡鬥，不僅兩敗俱傷，亦使公司及股東利益蒙受損失。\n本文以論述敵意併購之定義作展開，從比較法角度探討美國與臺灣法體制下可採行的敵意併購與防衛措施。相比於臺灣，美國與中國企業併購已行之多年，實務上積累豐富的市場經驗。是故，本文進一步從比較法上之立法沿革，針對美國聯邦及各州法對敵意併購行為的立場，與常見的敵意併購防衛措施類型予以介紹，並搭配相關實際重要案例，並且搭配事件研究法分析結果，作為此期間雙方攻防互動對於股東權益是否有顯著影響的依據，以說明美國與中國實務操作情形。由於企業併購所帶來的整合效益為重要的競爭手段，如能使企業之間，不再受限於法律體制或政府作為的僵化，使企業不僅可透過合意併購的模式，亦能合理的運用敵意併購。本文希望透過對美國與中國比較法之研究，構築出敵意併購防衛措施之適當性與合法性判斷標準，並分析其是否適合作為臺灣法體制未來建立相關規範之參考。

With the rapid internationalization and liberalization of economic development, in order to pursue the success of the business in terms of economy of scale, operational efficiency, market share expansion, sustainable competitive advantages. Corporations are increasingly compelled to accelerate advancement in competitiveness via mergers and acquisitions. In 2016, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) witnessed a spike in mergers and acquisitions due to widespread national policy support. This research paper presents an introduction and an explanation of the legitimacy of antitakeover defenses centered on the commercial legal systems in China.\nThe actions taken by the party initiating hostile takeover and the target company often led to corporate control contests, making both parties and the shareholders suffer losses. We use event study’s result as evidence for whether the stock holder’s wealth had changed significantly during the event period. As mergers and acquisitions are an important means of competition for corporations, how to enable corporations to utilize takeover mechanisms without the restrictions of the letter of the law or government oversight. This thesis begins by introducing and explaining the comparative definition of mergers and acquisitions, and hostile takeovers in China and United States. It also introduces the legislative history of mergers and acquisitions, states anti-takeover statutes, and judicial review standards in China. Furthermore, it discusses the legitimacy of antitakeover defenses in the U.S. and Taiwan. Finally, this thesis formulates conclusions and suggestions.