公開收購下之資訊使用與內線交易──以開發金控併金鼎證券案為例

Abstract

公開收購之發布往往牽動目標公司股價之漲跌，獲悉消息並在消息公開前買賣目標公司股份者，經常獲利甚鉅。本文藉由已經三審定讞的開發金控併購金鼎證券一案，探討公開收購人資訊使用與內線交易的相關問題，包括公開收購人在公開收購消息公開前，依照自己的規劃與資訊，買進目標公司股票，是否成立內線交易？公開收購人能否將未公開之消息，傳遞給他人，使他人在消息公開前買進目標公司股票？他人能否與公開收購人共同取得目標公司股份，或共組聯盟進行布局？又二○一六年修正的企業併購法第27條第10項明文規定，為併購目的，得以不公開方式先行單獨或與他人共同取得任一公開發行公司已發行股份總數10%以下的股份。此新增條文與內線交易之關係為何？本文從內線交易的規範理論出發，分析比較美國、歐盟、英國與香港等法域之規範，並評析開發金控併金鼎證券案以及企業併購法之相關規定。

This paper analyses the insider trading in the context of tender offers, mainly focusing on the following questions: Can the tender offeror acquire shares of the target (i.e. stakebuilding/toe acquisition) before announcing the tender offer on the basis of its own tender offer intention? Can any other person acquire shares of the target? Persons in concert or consortium? The new Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act has taken effect on January 8, 2016, and Article 27 (10) provides any person can alone or with others acquire 10% or less shares of a publicly traded company for the purpose of the merger and acquisition. Will the new provision become a safe harbor for insider trading? By analyzing the theory of insider trading, regulations and laws of the United States, EU, UK and Hong Kong, this paper provides suggestions on how the current laws apply on the balance of maintaining the market integrity and facilitating M&A transactions.