Common Interests and Two-Level Game Theory in the South China Sea Dispute

Abstract

Previous studies already demonstrate that interest indicators from realists demonstrate significant results between interstate conflict and states’ interests. By investigating cross-Strait relations, this paper suggests that the deepening of both political and economic interests boosts the political will to implement peaceful talks for the China-Taiwan dyad. However, the exchange of opinions and cooperation based on the common interests did not provide the cross-Strait relations any further stability during Ma’s second presidency. In contrast, the social split and contesting politics in Taiwan slowed down the cooperation between Beijing and Taipei. Since international and domestic politics affect each other, we need to apply Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory to investigate if there are any interactions between the power and preferences of the major actors at their domestic level, especially on domestic constituents’ preferences. The author uses the 2014 Sun Flower Movement in Taiwan and the South China Sea issue to illustrate the importance of aggregation of states’ interests between Beijing and Taipei, and argues that the maintenance of status-quo on the South China Sea issue may provide more stability to the cross-Strait relations.