法國對剛果共和國及象牙海岸之促進民主外援之效應

Abstract

This thesis examines the effects of French aid on the democratic practices of both Côte d’Ivoire and the Congo Republic from 1990 to 2016. It does so through the lens of the realist scholar Morgenthau’s (1962). Morgenthau’s definition of foreign aid as being ‘the transfer of goods and services from a nation to another’ enables this research to assess the CFA Franc currency as a form of aid, therefore, the categories of aid defined by Morgenthau (1962) allows us to identify several types of French aid; The conventional bribery aid, the subsistence aid, the promotion of the economic development of recipient countries as a justification for the use of the CFA Franc and the subsistence aid to maintain the existence of the CFA Franc. French bribery and subsistence aid are used to support or oppose incumbents during important political events, depending on the incumbent’s capacity and willingness to protect French interests. This research finds that bribery aid to replace a non-compliant incumbent increases the likelihood of civil war, while subsistence aid spent to maintain a compliant incumbent in office increase the likelihood of the occurrence of an authoritarian rule. On the other hand, the CFA Franc currency, monetary union and decision making process allow France and the European union (from 1999) to have exclusive access to both countries domestic markets, and to have cheap access to strategic natural resources (uranium, petroleum) and commercial resources (cocoa and coffee, diamonds). This research finds that the provision of the CFA Franc by France slows down the socio-economic development of both case study countries, undermines the monetary sovereignty and the democratic accountability within the monetary unions’ decision making organs, and creates dependency on France which makes both Côte d`Ivoire and the Congo remain in the CFA Franc zone. Moreover, bribery and subsistence aid are additional tools for France to maintain both case study countries within the Franc zone.