預購贈品做為差別取價的工具

Abstract

This article offers a different pricing strategy for a monopolist to price discriminate between consumers of heterogeneous valuations for a product. In an intertemporal setting in which valuation of the product is uncertain when consumers purchase the product in advance, instead of using advance-purchase discounts, a monopolist can offer bonus gifts to consumers who purchase in advance to discriminate heterogeneous consumers. Consumers decide whether to purchase the product in advance and get bonus gifts when the valuation of the product is uncertain, or delay their purchasing decision until the valuation of the product is certain. In our result, if a monopolist uses advance purchase with bonus gifts policy and the value of bonus gifts is homogeneous across consumers, consumers of high valuation for the main product purchase in advance and receive bonus gifts; consumers of low valuation for the main product delay their purchasing decisions and purchase the product only in the state in which the uncertainty of the product is revealed to be high. We find a unique solution of price to maximize the monopolist`s profit. Furthermore, we compare the advance purchase with bonus gifts policy with advance-purchase discounts and find a necessary and sufficient condition in which advance purchase with bonus gifts is the monopolist`s optimal pricing strategy. In comparison to using the pure bundling policy, a monopolist using advance purchase with bonus gifts policy has higher profit. We also find that from firm`s perspective, if a monopolist faces an intertemporal pricing decision, advance purchase with bonus gifts strategy dominates pure bundling strategy. A monopolist can abstract additional surplus from consumers and harm the total social welfare by using advance purchase with bonus gifts policy.