美國非營利組織收益管理行為之分析

Abstract

美國民眾將非營利組織的組織效能與財務效率畫上等號，認為財務績效佳的組織就是好組織。因此，管理當局為達到民眾要求之財務效率，甚至透過會計認列方式的彈性選擇窗飾真實財務數字。從理論的角度分析，非營利組織「收益管理」行為對捐款者捐款決策之影響類似於Vesterlund(2003)的邏輯，非營利組織透過財務報導，降低與捐款者間的資訊不對稱，應該有益於其未來捐款收入的增加。然而，本研究試圖比以往文獻多考慮會計操縱的因素，亦即若管理當局透過誇大募款金額的方式浮報收益數，隱藏真實類型來誤導捐款者對其品質的判斷，此「收益管理」行為便可能侵蝕訊息傳遞效果，使得捐款者降低其捐款意願，並且減少捐贈金額。進一步言，當誇大募款金額浮報收益數之「收益管理」現象存在時，高品質之非營利組織的募款所得不可能高於無「收益管理」時所能募得的金額，而低品質之非營利組織則將因從事「收益管理」而獲得較佳的募款績效。從實證的角度分析，如果可以證明非營利組織確實有誇大收益的現象，則於前面所述之理論部分，加入探討非營利組織誇大收益的因素，就顯得相當必要且合理。因此，本文從實證研究的角度探討非營利組織有無「收益管理」行為？實證結果證明，非營利組織管理當局會為了避免行政業務支出占收益數之比率逾越限制，而採取誇大募款金額的方式來浮報收益數。

Managers face a growing tendency among contributors and the public to equate financial efficiency with nonprofit organizational effectiveness. In order to favorably represent the entity`s financial performance, the managers of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) may intentially misstate their financial information. Vesterlund (2003) suggests that NPOs often choose to announce past contributions, because it helps reveal their quality. If the past contributions, which NPOs announce, are higher, the NPOs are more likely to be regarded as the good type and receive more contributions thereby. But Vesterlund (2003) doesn`t consider the possibility that NPOs will not necessarily report the contribution level truthfully, i.e., they inflate the level of past contributions to mislead donors. We examine the properties of reported revenue levels of the 1,400 U.S. UnitedWay between 1990 and 2001. Our results demonstrate part of these organizations are possibly engaged in revenue management by inflating past contributions, in order to lower the administrative cost ratio or to mislead their donors. Therefore, it`s necessary to take this accounting manipulation behaviour into account, in the theoretical research on the topics of NPOs` announcement strategies.