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Hobbes;H.L.A. Hart;Laws of Nature;Legal Positivism;Morality
This essay explores Hobbes's account of the mutual-containment thesis, which has been a puzzle for Hobbes scholars. Specifically, it investigates Hobbes's account of the relationship between positive and natural law, i.e., law and morality. While the core purpose of Hobbes's political thought appears to justify an absolute power, and hence Hobbes was often seen as a legal positivist (akin to John Austin's command theory), his account of laws of nature (supposed to impose restrictions upon political authority) has been gaining attention in recent years. Additionally, I argue that Hobbes's account of laws of nature is neither ＂self-effacing＂, as some have argued, nor a ＂façade of absolutism＂. While Hobbes's conception of laws of nature as equity does not impose limits upon sovereign power as traditional natural laws did, it has function through rulings of the subordinate Judge. I indicate that Hobbes's accounts of the role and importance of the Judge's interpretation, and how the law is verified by the subordinate Judge, show that his legal theory has been oversimplified by both the legal positivist and natural law interpretations. I conclude that neither of these contrasting theories is able to tell the whole story of Hobbes's legal theory.
|Relation:||A Journal for Philosophical Study of Public Affairs 政治與社會哲學評論, No.68期, pp.107-142|
|Appears in Collections:||[政治學系] 期刊論文|
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