IPO中的基石投資人制度在台灣之適用

Abstract

台灣資本市場為了使資本市場國際化、提高配售效率而引入詢價圈購制度；又為了減少詢價圈購所導致的配售不公平而改採原則上優先採用競價拍賣；近年來全球資本市場、交易所相互競爭吸引優質企業掛牌上市，台灣為了吸引獨角獸在台灣證券交易所上市，在優先採用競價拍賣制度中，開了多元上市櫃的途徑；後又為了增加對獨角獸的吸引力，引進了基石投資人制度，希望給獨角獸更多股權安排彈性空間、更低的募資成本。\n政府治國目的不僅是促進金融發展，社會公平無疑也是近代政府努力的目標。如何在金融彈性與監理甚至是資本大眾化中尋求平衡，常讓人傷透腦筋。本文嘗試提出建議，希冀基石投資人制度能讓台灣金融市場、台灣社會更好。\n首先關於基石投資人制度最常被討論的閉鎖期之問題。基石投資人雖然大量認購IPO股份，在台灣的制度下，最多仍不得於掛牌時達到已發行股份之10%，並非大股東，對於公司重大訊息之掌控亦不能與內部人相提並論。故似無一定要用閉鎖期間限制股份轉讓以維持市場秩序之必要。\n本文認為，與其鎖定基石投資人之認購而限制了基石投資人之財產權又影響了發行公司價值之自然形成(流動性不足、懸空效應賣壓)，或可將1年的閉鎖期間改為1年內不論掛牌時單一基石投資人持股總量占公司掛牌時已發行股份總額之百分比，基石投資人之持股轉讓方式須受一定限制(例如：證券交易法規定之內部人轉讓持股之事前申報制度)且持股變動也可參考證券交易法關於內部人股權申報之規定。如此能夠讓股票市場保有流動性並顯示公司之真實價值，更重要的是，在達到維持市場秩序目的的同時，讓投資大眾可以透過持股轉讓公告及股權申報來判斷公司之價值與未來變化作為投資依據，相較於將基石投資人認購鎖於閉鎖期之暗櫃中，對於基石投資人的財產權、真實價格之形成與散戶投資人的保護更為有利。\n再者關於資本大眾化之社會公平議題，本文認為，引入基石投資人後，已經有非常強大的推薦功能而且相對於詢價圈購對象之機構投資人，基石投資人認購部分通常更多，在保證獲得/發出配售下，詢價圈購最重要的配售效率與促進IPO成功機會之功能可以被基石投資人所取代，此情況下或可考慮提高回補之數額，以平衡機構投資人(於此包含基石投資人)與散戶投資人之認購分配，促進資本大眾化。

In order to internationalize the capital market and improve the efficiency of the placement, the Taiwan capital market has introduced Book Building into the market；In order to reduce the unfair placing caused by the Book Building, since 2016 IPO case in Taiwan principally preferential use Auction in placement. In recent years, global capital markets and exchanges have competed to attract high-quality companies to list. In order to attract Unicorns to be listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Taiwan has opened up multiple listing cabinets under principally preferential use Auction in placement policy. Later, in order to increase the attractiveness to Unicorns, the cornerstone investor system was introduced, hoping to give the Unicorn more flexibility in equity arrangements and lower funding costs.\nThe purpose of government governance is not only to promote financial development, but also social equity is undoubtedly the goal of modern government to efforts to. How to find a balance between financial resilience and supervision, and even capital popularization, often make people distressing. This article attempts to make suggestions that help the cornerstone investor system become optimized to make Taiwan`s financial market and Taiwan`s society better.\nFirst of all, the most commonly discussed issue ois lock-up period for the cornerstone investor . Although cornerstone investors subscribe for a large number of IPO shares, under Taiwan ’s system, at most they are still not allowed to reach 10% of the issued shares at the time of listing. They are not major shareholders, and they cannot control the company ’s important information on a par with insiders. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to use the lock-up period to restrict the transfer of shares to maintain market stable.\nthe author believes that instead of locking the cornerstone investor`s subscription and restricting the cornerstone investor`s property rights and affecting the natural formation of the issuing company`s value (insufficient liquidity, dangling effect make selling pressure), the one-year lock-up period can be changed to one year Regardless of the percentage of the total shareholding of a single cornerstone investor in the company`s total shares issued at the time of listing, the method of transfer of shares held by cornerstone investors must be subject to certain restrictions (for example: prior to the transfer of shares held by an insider under the Securities Exchange Act Declaration demand) and the changes in shareholding can also refer to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act on the declaration of insider equity. In this way, the stock market can maintain liquidity and form the true value of the company. More importantly, while achieving the purpose of maintaining market stable, the public investor can judge the company ’s value and future changes through shareholding transfer announcements and equity declarations. Compared with locking the cornerstone investor`s subscription in a locker during the lock-up period, it is more beneficial to the cornerstone investor`s property rights, the formation of real prices and the protection of retail investors.\nSecond, regarding the social equity issue of capital popularization, the author believes that after the introduction of cornerstone investors, it already has a very powerful recommended influence. Compared with the institutional investors who are participate in bookbuilding, cornerstone investors usually subscribe more. Under the placement / issuance of placements, the most important placement efficiency and the promotion of IPO success opportunities can be replaced by cornerstone investors. In this case, may consider increasing the amount of clawback to balance the subscription allocation between institutional investors (including cornerstone investors) and retail investors.