Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131502| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 蕭舜文 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Hsiao, Shun-Wen | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | 宋昆原 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Sung, Kun-Yuan | en_US |
| dc.creator | 宋昆原 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | Sung, Kun-Yuan | en_US |
| dc.date | 2020 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-02T03:48:17Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-02T03:48:17Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09-02T03:48:17Z | - |
| dc.identifier | G0107356037 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131502 | - |
| dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 資訊管理學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 107356037 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Tickets to event are always limited, people would try their best to acquire tickets. They would access the server right after the tickets are available. In this moment, the server might suffer from a DDoS-like attack. In addition, there are scalpers who intend to snap up the tickets to resell them with a mark-up. With the exist of scalpers, the ticket-buying environment becomes quite unfair since a scalper might have more resources to compete the limited tickets. We propose a Proof-of-Work mechanism adding to ticket-selling system to decrease the number of requests sent to the server and also disperse all these requests in the selling period. We further use the concept of game theory to analyze the best condition for event holder to control what they want the buyers behave under the Proof-of-Work mechanism. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Chapter 1 Introduction 6\n1.1 Overview 6\n1.2 Motivation 6\n1.3 Problems and Goals 7\n1.4 Proposed Method 7\nChapter 2 Related Work 10\n1.1 Background 10\n1.2 Literature Review 11\nChapter 3 Method 13\n3.1 Problem Definition 13\n3.2 Assumption and Definition 14\n3.3 Scenario without PoW 15\n3.4 Mechanism Design 16\n3.5 Measurement 19\n3.6 Analytical Solution 21\nChapter 4 Evaluation 23\n4.1 Parameter Setting 23\n4.2 Simulation 24\n4.3 Emulation 34\nChapter 5 Conclusion 36\nReference 38 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 902475 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107356037 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 阻斷式攻擊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 工作量證明 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 賽局理論 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 黃牛票 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Proof-of-Work | en_US |
| dc.subject | Game Theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | DDoS | en_US |
| dc.subject | Ticket scalping | en_US |
| dc.title | 以工作量證明與賽局理論減輕售票系統的DDoS-like請求與黃牛行為 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Mitigating DDoS-like Requests and Ticket-Scalping in a Ticket-Selling System by Proof-of-Work and Game Theory | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference | [1] A. Back, “Hashcash-a denial of service counter-measure,” 2002.\n\n[2] A Agah et al., "Preventing DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks: A repeated game theory approach," IJ Network Security, 2007, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 145-153.\n\n[3] A. Michalas et al., “Cryptographic puzzles and game theory against dos and ddos attacks in networks,” International Journal of Computer Research, 2012, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 79.\n\n[4] B. Johnson et al., “Game-Theoretic Analysis of DDoS Attacks Against Bitcoin Mining Pools,” in Proc. of International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2014. pp. 72-86.\n\n[5] D. Mankins et al., "Mitigating distributed denial of service attacks with dynamic resource pricing," Seventeenth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 2001, pp. 411-421.\n\n[6] E. Kaiser and W. C. Feng, “Helping ticketmaster: Changing the economics of ticket robots with geographic proof-of-work,” in Proc. of 2010 INFOCOM IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, 2010. pp. 1-6.\n\n[7] H. Bedi et al., "Game theory-based defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks on TCP/TCP-friendly flows," IEEE symposium on computational intelligence in cyber security, 2011, pp. 129-136.\n\n[8] N. Sá et al., "Ticket pricing and scalping: A game theoretical approach," The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2013, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 627-653.\n\n[9] P. Courty, "Some economics of ticket resale," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 85-97.\n\n[10] Q. Wu et al., "On modeling and simulation of game theory-based defense mechanisms against DoS and DDoS attacks," in Proc. of 2010 spring simulation multiconference, 2010, pp. 1-8.\n\n[11] T. Spyridopoulos et al., “A game theoretic defence framework against DoS/DDoS cyber attacks,” Computers & Security, vol. 38, pp. 39-50.\n\n[12] W. J. Blackert et al., “Analyzing interaction between distributed denial of service attacks and mitigation technologies,” in Proc. of DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 2003. pp. 26-36.\n\n[13] Y. Cui et al., "Should event organizers prevent resale of tickets?," Management Science, 2014, vol. 60, no. 9, pp. 2160-2179. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6814/NCCU202001483 | en_US |
| item.openairetype | thesis | - |
| item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 | |
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| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 603701.pdf | 881.32 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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