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Title: 全球化對制裁效力的影響
Effects of Globalization on Sanction Effectiveness
Authors: 傑姆
Kovalenko, Artem
Contributors: 薛健吾
Chien-wu Alex Hsueh
Artem Kovalenko
Keywords: 經濟制裁
Economic sanctions
sanction effectiveness
political globalization
human rights
sanctions outcome
Date: 2020
Issue Date: 2020-09-02 13:13:10 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 在有關制裁效力的文獻中,學者們發現了許多變量,這些變量會影響目標國家是否屈服於發送者的要求或堅持並屈服制裁。但是,很少有研究談論全球化對制裁結果的影響。全球化是一個連接國家並在參與者之間建立聯繫的過程。這項研究發現,先前研究中影響制裁有效性的因素可以歸因於全球化,因此,全球化有可能與目標國抵抗制裁和制裁的能力相關。
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have discovered a large number of variables, which have an impact on the decision of a target state to succumb to sender’s demands or to stand firm and deflect sanctions. However, few studies talk about the influence of globalization on sanction outcomes. Globalization is a process which connects nations and creates ties between actors. This research discovered that factors affecting sanction effectiveness from previous studies could be attributed to globalization, thus, there is a possibility that globalization may correlate with an ability of a target to resist sanctions treats and impositions.
The study assessed the effects of political, economic and social globalizations separately. Such division is used by a number of researchers, and is due to the fact that globalization is a complicated term, which includes many variables. These measurements in their turn have a different impact on the sanction outcome.
Increase in the political globalization index is predicted to help a target to successfully repel sender’s demands. The trust and transparency created by the aforementioned globalization type are crucial in getting this outcome. At the same time economic and social globalizations do not change the effectiveness level, as they are comprised of variables, which if estimated one by one have either positive or negative correlation with the final outcome. Thus, mitigating the effects of these two types on the general sanction’s result.
By applying the TIES and the KOF data as well as evaluating cases of Peru and Indonesia the study was able to show clearer the impact of political globalization. Both countries from 1992 to 2005 faced with several sanctions’ episodes, and with the increase in their political globalization index they were able to deflect sender’s demands, although before that occurred they were forced to acquiesce.
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Data Type: thesis
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