Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132456


Title: 共和國的長子們:初探中國央企領導人的管理體制
The ";eldest sons";of the republic: the management system of China’s central state-owned enterprise leaders
Authors: 劉明浩
Liu, Ming-Hao
Contributors: 童涵浦
Tung, Han-Pu
劉明浩
Liu, Ming-Hao
Keywords: 央企
雙軌管理制度
黨管幹部
幹部級別
central state-owened enterprise
dual-track management system
the principle for CCP in charge of cadres
rank of cadre
Date: 2020
Issue Date: 2020-11-03 11:30:21 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 在中國大陸政治經濟體制中,央企涵蓋大陸所有的公共事業與壟斷性行業,中國政府透過企業領導階層的垂直式人事任命機制控制央企,使央企成為施行宏觀調控的重要途徑。央企的人事任命機制與黨國體制密不可分,央企領導人既是企業經理人也是國家幹部,受「黨管幹部」原則約束。然而央企的獨特地位產生雙重目標的矛盾:維持政府控制與增加企業獲利。中國政府如何處理這個問題?本研究提出「雙軌管理制度」理論架構:政府以企業承擔政策任務程度區分政治軌與市場軌,兩者分別對應不同的控制程度、企業目標、領導人徵選條件,以及最重要的激勵機制。透過「雙軌管理制度」,中國政府得以在兩個矛盾的目標之間取得均衡。本研究以1998至2018年,國企改革後央企領導人的組成特徵與仕途升遷的資料進行實證分析,並依此發展「雙軌管理制度」的模型。分析證明央企依照級別分軌,副部級企業領導人有較高的晉升機率;除此之外,非正式關係也是影響幹部升遷的另一個因素。「雙軌管理制度」運行相當穩定,甚至不受成立監管機構以及習近平時期集權改革的影響。整體而言,共和國的長子們間亦有高下之別,副部級央企是共和國的嫡長子,負擔更多的政治責任,也擁有更多的權力,政府透過責任與權力的交換驅策副部級央企。
This thesis addresses how Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has evolved a “dual-track management system” of the central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to maintain the equilibrium of two paradoxical goals: keeping government control and increasing corporate profits. In Chinese political-economic regime, CSOEs have occupied almost every public utilitiy and monopolistic industry. CCP controls CSOEs through vertical personnel appointment of the enterprise leadership, taking CSOEs as a medium for market intervention. The CSOEs’ leaders are corporate managers also party cadres, being applied the principle for CCP in charge of cadres. This unique status of the leadership strengthens the government’s control over CSOEs, but is not conductive to corporate profits. Therefore, CCP divided CSOEs’ leaders into two parallel tracks: political track and market track. The two tracks correspond to different conditions, such as government control, corporate goals, leadership selection, and the most importantly: incentive mechanism. The incentive mechanism is the core of the dual-track management system. If the corporate leaders were selected to the political track, they would accomplish government’s goals actively to pursue their promotion. Comparatively, the leaders who were in the market track would be more concerned about corporate profits and their salaries. This thesis has an empirical analysis on the characteristics and promotion data of CSOEs’ leaders after the reform of state-owned enterprises from 1998 to 2018. The analysis proves that the rank of cadre is the basis for track division. And the leaders of CSOEs are promoted according to their ranks. In addition, informal relations are the secondary factor of cadre promotion. Generaly, the "dual-track management system" operates stable, not be affected by the establishment of regulatory agencies (SASAC) and the re-centralized reforms during the Xi era.
Reference: 中文

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英文

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二、期刊論文
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三、研討會論文
Mattlin, M. (2007, July). The Chinese Government’s new approach to ownership and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises. In BOFIT Discussion Paper, Helsinki, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1001617.
Qian, Y., & Wu, J. (2000, August). China’s Transition to a market Economy: How far Across the River?. In the Conference on Policy Reform In China, Stanford, https://kingcenter.stanford.edu/publications/chinas-transition-market-economy-how-far-across-river.

四、報刊
Pickert, K. (2008, July). A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. TIME, http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html.
Description: 博士
國立政治大學
東亞研究所
100260503
Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100260503
Data Type: thesis
Appears in Collections:[東亞研究所 ] 學位論文

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