On Two Recent Arguments against Intellectualism

Abstract

Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one`s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one`s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.

根據智性主義（intellectualism），影響S對p的認知地位（epistemic position）的因素，只能是與p是否為真相關的因素（truth-relevant factor）。近年來，有不少的哲學家對智性主義提出強而有力的反對論證。本文將探討其中兩個重要的反對論證。筆者主張，這兩個論證其實並沒有辦法證明，非智性主義比智性主義更合理。並且，通過檢視日常語言中，挑戰一個宣稱（challenging a claim）的語言資料（linguistic data），筆者將說明智性主義是非常符合一般人的直覺的。