多重威脅結構下的國家行為邏輯：中國戰國時期之同盟策略分析

Abstract

本文在對權力平衡理論進行簡要的回顧後，指出權力平衡理論在討論戰國時期各國的行為策略時，只能提供片面的、個案的解釋，而且在事件的預測上往往與史實相反，且在各國違反權力平衡邏輯的行為背後，似乎有一套系統性、趨勢性的行為邏輯。故此，筆者根據結構論的假設，假定個體層次的行為互動受到宏觀層次的結構邏輯支配，主張戰國體系存在一套與權力平衡邏輯截然相反的邏輯。而此一邏輯之所以與權力平衡邏輯不同，在於戰國時期特殊的多重威脅結構。由於多數主要行為者在多數時間皆面臨兩個以上明顯而強大、且彼此獨立的威脅，而權力平衡理論在處理多重威脅的情況時存在許多侷限，故在行為策略的選擇上便無法成為國家的指導原則。在多重威脅結構下，取代權力平衡理論成為國家指導原則的這套行為邏輯，筆者稱之為霍布斯邏輯。

By examining the Balance of Power (BOP) theory, this article suggests that the BOP theory can only supply a lopsided view to explain the strategy of the state in an individual case. Besides, the predictions of the BOP theory frequently are the opposites of history, and the violations of the BOP logic seem to leave behind a systematic and tendentious rule of actions. According to the assumption of structuralism, the interactions of logic at the micro-level are dominated by the logic at the macro-level; however, this article argues that there is a systematic logic which is entirely different to the BOP logic in the Warring State system. The logic of the Warring State system is unique because of the Multiple Threat Structure in it. The logic of the Warring State system is unique because of the Multiple Threat Structure that is included in it. However, powerful and independent states in the Warring State Period cannot be explained by this due to the BOP theory, which is limited to dealing with multiple threat scenarios. Therefore, the BOP theory cannot be the guiding principle when states are choosing their strategy of actions. Instead, ＂Hobbesian Logic＂ becomes the rule of interactions under the Multiple Threat Structure.