屬地化管理、中國式分權與地方政府的犯罪治理政策：來自轉型期的證據

Abstract

轉型期中國不斷攀升的社會犯罪成為政府亟需解決的治理難題。屬地化分級犯罪治理下該難題的挑戰在於如何處理好央地政府間的分權關係。利用1997年至2006年30個分省TSCS資料並結合多層線性模型，本文使用政府支出偏好模型實證檢證了經濟分權與政治集權相結合的中國式分權對地方政府犯罪治理政策的影響。本文發現：屬地化分級管理體制下，地方政府傾向採用中央政府的嚴打政策以回應社會犯罪問題。不過，財政分權使得地方政府在犯罪治理上既沒有動力偏向中央政府的嚴打政策，也沒有意願主動採用替代性的胡蘿蔔政策。與此同時，中央政府可以通過政治激勵和官僚整合控制地方政府犯罪治理的政策行為。2006年之前中央政府堅持嚴打政策，官僚整合促使地方政府積極執行嚴打政策，但官僚整合對地方政府是否採用胡蘿蔔政策卻無實質性的影響。

Rising crime rate has been a major concern for all levels of governments in transitional China. One of the greatest challenges is how to handle the relations between the central and local governments since crime prevention is managed by the jurisdictional governments. This paper sets out a governmental expenditure preference model and uses provincial time-series cross-sectional data over 1997~2006, to investigate the effects of decentralization on local government crime prevention policies. Results from multilevel models show that local governments were responsive to crime by Strike Hard policy. However, local governments were less likely to implement Strike Hard measures or adopt carrots policy when fiscal decentralization was higher. Moreover, bureaucratic control only made sense to local governments when the political incentives of the central government were both strong and clear. During 1997~2006, bureaucratic integration urged local governments to use Strike Hard policy, but had no substantive impact on carrots policy.