決策樹應用於國軍戰力防護之研究-以空軍防空飛彈部隊為例

Abstract

摘要\n我國目前有愛國者、天弓及鷹式飛彈等3種不同型態的中、高空防空飛彈部隊，各部隊具有不同的各項參數，加上各部隊所面臨的戰場環境及單位戰力不同，決策者在選擇行動時更需要以客觀的科學方式作出決策。\n本研究藉由文獻回顧獲得影響防空飛彈部隊戰力防護行動決策的因素，區分為防護對象、執行時間、我軍作戰能力及敵人作戰能力等4個構面，以模糊德爾菲法遴選出12項指標，分別是指揮所、重要設施、友軍地面防衛部隊、飛彈陣地、戰鬥前、自作戰開始至結束、裝備妥善狀況、我軍武器命中率、預備戰術位置數量、敵軍武器命中率、敵軍武器數量、敵軍武器破壞程度等，並以層級分析法衡量各指標的權重，藉由各防空飛彈部隊的模擬資料庫和共軍攻臺方式的模擬情境之建立，運用訓練集決策樹模型推論各情境中防空飛彈部隊的行動是否符合防空作戰及戰力保存的需求並進行分析。\n在分析戰力防護各項指標的過程中，發現敵人命中率指標是我方無法控制的變數，經過敏感度分析後發現飛彈部隊的裝備妥善率及指揮所數量對飛彈部隊戰力防護行動決策有很大的影響，因此若能針對獲得零件及飛彈相對較費時間的美系裝備提高戰備存量，將能提高飛彈部隊的戰場存活率。另外在指揮所數量的策略方面，若能將海、空軍指揮所平均設立於不同的地區，將有助於減少選擇防空作戰行動的防空飛彈部隊，提高其戰場存活率。

Abstract\nCurrently, there are three different types of medium- and high-altitude air defense missile forces in Taiwan: Patriot, Tiangong, and HAWK missiles. Each unit has different parameters. In addition, each unit faces different battlefield environments and different unit combat capabilities. Decision makers need to make decisions in an objective and scientific way when choosing their defensive actions.\nThis research uses a literature review to determine the factors that influence the decision-making of air defense missile forces’ combat effectiveness protection actions, and divides them into four dimensions: protection object, execution time, our combat capability, and enemy combat capability, in order to select and measure the total weight of each facet. The weights of 12 indicators are used to establish a database on each air defense missile force, simulate the situation of an army attacking Taiwan, and use the training set decision tree model to infer whether the actions of the air defense missile force in each situation meet the requirements of successful air defense operations and combat strength preservation.\nIn the process of analyzing the various indicators of combat power protection, it was found that the enemy`s hit rate index was a variable regarding which we could not control. After conducting a sensitivity analysis, it was found that the missile force’s equipment adequacy rate and the number of command posts had a significant effect on the decision-making of the missile force’s combat power protection actions. As these factors exert a great impact, if we can increase the combat readiness inventory for the relatively time-consuming American equipment to obtain parts and missiles, it will increase the battlefield survival rate of the missile force. In addition, in terms of the strategy of the number of command posts, if the naval and air force command posts can be equally set up in different areas, it will help reduce the number of air defense missile units that choose air defense operations, and increase their survival rate on the battlefield.