奧古斯丁的「訴諸意欲能力的論證」： 霍普金斯對「標準詮釋」的批評

Abstract

「神學命定論」問題（上帝的預知與受造物的自由是否相容）一直是在哲學神學中受關注的課題。根據羅偉的看法，奧古斯丁對這個問題的最主要回應是「訴諸意欲能力的論證」。奧古斯丁主張，人的任何意欲行為都是在他的能力以內，也就是說，意志就其本質而言是自由的。奧古斯丁以這個論點作為基礎，論證上帝的預知與人的自由是相容的。羅偉對這個論證的分析與批判，被認為是對奧古斯丁回應神學命定論問題的「標準詮釋」。霍普金斯批評羅偉未正確掌握奧古斯丁的解決方案所以失敗的理由，但是霍普金斯本人卻沒有清楚說明真正的理由何在。本文藉著檢查霍普金斯對奧古斯丁的論證的表述，以及對標準詮釋的批評，嘗試釐清「訴諸意欲能力的論證」需要面對的問題。

According to William Rowe, Augustine’s principal response to the problem of theological fatalism consists in his argument from the power to will. For some years, Rowe’s presentation and critique of the argument has been accepted as the standard interpretation of Augustine’s solution. Jasper Hopkins maintains that while Augustine’s solution does not succeed, the reasons for the lack of success has not been accurately stated by Rowe. By reexamining Hospers’ analysis of Augustine’s argument as well as his criticisms on Rowe, I try to discern what constitutes a real challenge for Augustine’s argument.