An Experimental Study on the Effects of Democracy on Tax Compliance

Abstract

我們以經濟學實驗方法探討實驗參與者在可以對稅率、稽核率、或懲罰率表決的環境中，他們的租稅順從行為與民主效果。我們藉由在實驗中加入由Dal Bó et al.（2010）所提出的電腦隨機決策階段來控制選擇效果。我們的實驗證據顯示當投票的變數是懲罰率時，民主效果存在。我們也發現當實驗參與者面對高稽核率或高懲罰率時，會比面對低稽核率或低懲罰率來得較順從。不過投高稅率、稽核率、或懲罰率的人未必比投低稅率、稽核率、或懲罰率的人來得順從，尤其當最後適用的是較高者。

We experimentally investigate behavioral compliance and the effects of democracy on tax compliance in an environment in which subjects are allowed to vote on the tax, audit, or fine rate. We control for the selection effect by adding a randomization stage of computer decisions similar to that proposed by Dal Bó et al. (2010). Our experimental evidence shows that democracy has an effect on compliance when fine rates are to be voted on. We also find that subjects behave more compliantly when a higher audit rate or a higher fine rate is applied than when a lower counterpart is applied. However, subjects having voted for a high rate are not necessarily more compliant than those who voted for a low rate, especially when a high rate is applied.