Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135342


Title: 中國上市公司薪酬差距對經營績效的影響
The Effects of Compensation Gap on the Performance of Listed Companies in China
Authors: 林晏如
Lin, Yan-Ru
Contributors: 翁永和
林晏如
Lin, Yan-Ru
Keywords: 薪酬差距
經營績效
Compensation gap
Performance
Date: 2021
Issue Date: 2021-06-01 14:58:46 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 本研究針對中國滬深兩市上市公司之2015至2019年資料進行研究,探討高階管理層人員與普通員工的薪酬差距對於中國上市公司經營績效之影響,以驗證「組織行為理論」與「錦標賽理論」在中國上市公司中的適用性。並通過整理回顧過往相關文獻,一併探討其他影響經營績效之可能要素。本研究利用761家國有企業與1285家非國有企業之面板數據,建立固定效果模型進行回歸分析,探討在不同公司性質下,不同因素對公司經營績效的影響。
本研究實證結果顯示:對於中國國有上市公司而言,「薪酬差距」、「公司規模」、「成長性」、「資本結構」及「股權集中度」5項變數通過了顯著性水準檢定,即為中國國有上市公司經營績效的重要決定因素。其中,「薪酬差距」這一變數與公司經營績效呈正相關關係,表明錦標賽理論更適用於中國國有上市公司。在現有的政策體制下,可以继续擴大公司內部的薪酬差距,以此激勵員工創造更高的公司效益。
對於中國非國有上市公司而言,「薪酬差距」、「公司規模」、「經營時間」、「成長性」、「資本結構」及「股權集中度」6項變數均通過了顯著性水準檢定,為中國非國有上市公司經營績效的重要決定因素。其中,「薪酬差距」這一變數與公司經營績效呈正相關關係,這支持了錦標賽理論的說法。對於中國非國有上市公司而言,擴大薪酬差距的激勵左右還並未完全得到發揮,可以繼續過大非國有企業內部的薪酬差距,使員工的工作積極性提高,從而提高公司的經營績效。
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of the Compensation gap between senior managers and ordinary employees on the company's performance of listed companies in China from 2015 to 2019. In order to verify the applicability of the Organizational Behavior Theory and the Tournament Theory in Chinese listed companies. And through sorting and reviewing the related literature, we also discuss other possible factors that affect performance. This study uses panel data from 761 state-owned enterprises and 1285 non-state-owned enterprises to establish a fixed effect model for regression analysis to identify the impact of different factors on the company’s performance under different company properties.
The results of this study show that for state-owned listed companies, the five variables of “GAP”, “SIZE”, “GROW”, “LEV” and “LHR” have passed the significance level test, namely it is the important determinant of the performance of China state-owned listed companies. The variable “GAP” is positively correlated with the performance, indicating that the Tournament theory is more applicable to state-owned listed companies. Under the current policy system, continuing to expand the salary gap within the company to encourage employees to create higher company benefits.
For non-state-owned listed companies, "GAP", "SIZE", "AGE", "GROW", "LEV" and "LHR" six variables have passed the significance level test, which is the important determinant of the performance of non-state-owned listed companies. The variable “GAP” is positively correlated with the performance, which supports the theory of the Tournament theory. For non-state-owned listed companies, the incentives to expand the pay gap have not been fully utilized, and the pay gap within non-state-owned companies can continue to be large, so that employees' enthusiasm for work will increase, thereby improving the company's operating performance.
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Description: 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
108258047
Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108258047
Data Type: thesis
Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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