新問題、舊矛盾？三級機關政務與常務雙軌制分析

Abstract

民主國家透過選舉制度取得執政權的民選首長，執政後任命政務領導，實現選舉時的承諾；但無限制的政治任命，將損害維繫國家穩定的常任文官體系。因此，政治任命的範圍與規模，一直都是民主治理的重要課題。在2017年，我國中央行政機關組織基準法第18條的修正，也引發學術與實務界針對三級機關首長改採政務任用與否的討論。雖然看似為一個「新」的制度變革議題，但背後的問題則源自政策過程中的「舊」有矛盾。在民主化後，取得政權的執政者試圖透過政治任命的方式，來「導引」政策方向與「分配」行政資源，但在舊有的制度矛盾下，改革必然與原有文官體制產生碰撞。因此，本研究嘗試釐清兩個研究問題：（1）在政治任命的邏輯下，三級機關政務常務雙軌制背後反映出哪些衝突與矛盾？（2）執政者可以透過哪些方式來化解上述的衝突與矛盾？藉由訪談25位政務官與高階事務官，本研究發現，三級機關首長政務常務雙軌化牽涉政策規劃與政策執行兩者根本上難以區分的議題；由於三級機關首長往往身兼規劃與執行的雙重角色，因而在政務化後，可能引發一系列關於行政中立、政治課責的問題。此外，本研究亦發現執政者對三級機關首長的任用，多是以「控制」行政資源的觀點為主，而較缺乏公共績效面向的討論。基於上述發現，本研究針對我國未來政治任用規範與文官制度改革提出建議。

In a democratic country, ruling parties and leaders could appoint political appointees to fulfill their policy commitments. The expansion of political appointments, however, could sabotage the civil servant system and the stability of the government. Therefore, the scope and magnitude of political appointments is a crucial topic in democratic governance research. In 2017, Taiwan`s government initiated a revision of Article 18 of the Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations, leading to rigorous debates of the potential politicization risk of third-level agencies. Although the disputes seem to be ＂new＂ problems of the institutional reform, they might originate from the ＂old＂ paradoxes of policy processes. Moreover, we argue that it reflects the phenomenon that political leaders endeavor to orient public policy and distribute administrative resources, and clash with the existing civil servant system after democratization. We therefore attempt to clarify two research questions in this article: (1) What kind of collisions and paradoxes did the revision of Article 18 of the Basic Code Governing Central Administrative Agencies Organizations reflect? and (2) What strategies could political leaders use to reconcile the above collisions and paradoxes? By collecting data from 25 political appointees and senior civil servants through in-depth interviews, we indicate that the upheaval behind the amendment results from the ambiguous characteristics of third-level agencies, caused by a vague demarcation between policy planning and implementation. In addition, we argue that most political leaders seldom discuss the role of public performance when appointing heads of third-level agencies, but paid more attention on the amount of administrative resources they could control. Based on those findings, we propose practical suggestions for potential reforms in the future.