盈餘管理與經理人盈餘預測修正的關聯性

Abstract

利用日本的上市公司的強制盈餘修正資料，本文主要探討企業的盈餘管理行動與盈餘預測的關聯性。日本雖然強制企業發布盈餘預測，但也容許企業在預見將來的盈餘可能有重大變動時可以修正之前所發布的盈餘預測數字。先前的研究文獻對於盈餘預測修正的研究主要有兩項結果。有文獻指出企業會進行盈餘管理以避免修正盈餘預測，但也有研究結果指出企業會先發布偏高的初始盈餘預測，然後再慢慢的調降後續預測以避免負的盈餘驚喜。本研究利用應計項目與實質盈餘指標發現，盈餘管理與盈餘預測修正有負的相關。本研究同時也發現在向下修正盈餘預測的公司與發佈多次盈餘預測修正的公司的盈餘管理也是與盈餘預測修正之間有負的相關。但是本研究並沒有在向上修正盈餘預測的公司發現盈餘管理與盈餘預測修正之間的關聯。本研究同時發現，在發布多次盈餘修正的情況下，向上修正與向下修正的結果是不變的。

Using mandatory forecast revisions data from listed firms in Japan, I examine the association between earnings management and management earnings forecasts. Japan’s disclosure system allows firms to revise previous earnings forecasts if they foresee any significant changes. Previous studies have yielded somewhat mixed results: (a) firms manage earnings to avoid issuing earnings revisions and (b) firms issue upward-biased initial forecasts and then revise subsequent forecasts downward to avoid negative earnings surprises. Using metrics for both accrual-based and real earnings management, I find that earnings management is negatively associated with earnings forecast discrepancies. I also find a negative association between earnings management and forecast discrepancies for firms that issue downward forecast revisions and multiple forecast revisions. However, I find no association between earnings management and forecast discrepancies for firms that issue upward revisions. The results hold for upward and downward revisions under the condition of multiple revisions.