Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: The Effects of China's Development Projects on Political Accountability
Authors: 張文揚
Chang, Wen-Yang
Ping, Szu-Ning
Wang, Yi-Ting
Contributors: 外交系
Keywords: China's development projects;political accountability;natural resources;state-owned enterprises
Date: 2020-02
Issue Date: 2021-07-21 09:19:44 (UTC+8)
Abstract: The literature on the relationship between foreign aid and institutions has found that the effects of aid vary across different donor characteristics and delivery mechanisms. This article focuses on China's resource-related development projects, which have been considered controversial due to the relative lack of conditionality. By distinguishing between vertical and horizontal dimensions of political accountability, the study finds that China's resource-related projects are particularly detrimental to the accountability of recipient countries' horizontal (legislative and judicial) institutions. These projects are often delivered to resource-rich countries, in the form of packaging access to resources and infrastructure construction, to improve China's own energy access. Local officials may be tempted to weaken horizontal institutions so that the projects can be implemented quickly. Nevertheless, these projects have little effect on vertical accountability, as China has less intention and capacity to fundamentally restrain electoral competition in recipient countries.
Relation: British Journal of Political Science, pp.1-20
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[外交學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
191.pdf357KbAdobe PDF31View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing