Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136508
題名: 股權結構、董事會法制與經營風險之關聯性為何? -以台灣銀行產業實證研究為例
What is the Correlation between Ownership structure, Legal system of board of directors and Business Risk? -Evidence of Taiwan`s Banking Industry
作者: 李喬銘
Li, Chiao Ming
貢獻者: 周振鋒
李喬銘
Li,Chiao Ming
關鍵詞: 集中型股權
監督型董事會
經營風險
公司治理
日期: 2021
上傳時間: 4-Aug-2021
摘要: 本研究經由分析發現股權結構是公司治理具體運作形式之關鍵,從而實質控制董事會運作經營,本文分析,本國銀行產業屬於「集中型」股權, 本文亦認為主管機關應及早實施「提名委員會」,以及加強小股東特別選舉,促使產生能夠保護小股東權益之董事,進而加強董事之獨立性。「監督型」之董事會型態,能夠透過獨立董事真正之獨立性與專業表現,從事為公司決策把關,發揮監督功能; 「監督型」董事會之獨立董事薪酬機制,可連結獨立董事實際投入與產出,提供公司專業決策品質、意見諮詢、監督財務體質改善成果等等,有助於公司及股東之雙贏利益。營運風險之管理,除了提升法制化強度之外,更應借重「內部治理」與「外部監督」,有助於銀行風險管理。
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
法學院碩士在職專班
108961052
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108961052
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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