Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136508| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 周振鋒 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | 李喬銘 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author | Li,Chiao Ming | en_US |
| dc.creator | 李喬銘 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | Li, Chiao Ming | en_US |
| dc.date | 2021 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-04T07:45:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2021-08-04T07:45:13Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-08-04T07:45:13Z | - |
| dc.identifier | G0108961052 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136508 | - |
| dc.description | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 法學院碩士在職專班 | zh_TW |
| dc.description | 108961052 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究經由分析發現股權結構是公司治理具體運作形式之關鍵,從而實質控制董事會運作經營,本文分析,本國銀行產業屬於「集中型」股權, 本文亦認為主管機關應及早實施「提名委員會」,以及加強小股東特別選舉,促使產生能夠保護小股東權益之董事,進而加強董事之獨立性。「監督型」之董事會型態,能夠透過獨立董事真正之獨立性與專業表現,從事為公司決策把關,發揮監督功能; 「監督型」董事會之獨立董事薪酬機制,可連結獨立董事實際投入與產出,提供公司專業決策品質、意見諮詢、監督財務體質改善成果等等,有助於公司及股東之雙贏利益。營運風險之管理,除了提升法制化強度之外,更應借重「內部治理」與「外部監督」,有助於銀行風險管理。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I\n表目錄 III\n第一章 緒論 1\n第一節 研究動機 1\n第二節 研究目的 5\n第三節 研究方法與範圍 7\n第四節 研究架構 8\n第二章國內外公司治理發展 11\n第一節 國外公司治理發展近況 11\n第二節 國內公司治理發展近況 12\n第三節 公司治理與銀行產業 16\n第四節 小結 18\n第三章 股權結構與董事會法制 21\n第一節 股權結構實質問題 21\n第二節國內外股權結構差異分析 24\n第三節 銀行產業股權結構分析 27\n第四節 董事會法制 55\n第五節 小結 81\n第四章 經營風險與治理機制 83\n第一節 銀行經營風險 83\n第二節國內外風險管理之法制規範 86\n第三節治理機制 89\n第四節經營風險實證分析 90\n第五節 小結 93\n第五章 結論與建議 96\n第一節 結論 96\n第二節 建議 100\n參考文獻 102 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 5060331 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108961052 | en_US |
| dc.subject | 集中型股權 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 監督型董事會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 經營風險 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | 股權結構、董事會法制與經營風險之關聯性為何? -以台灣銀行產業實證研究為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | What is the Correlation between Ownership structure, Legal system of board of directors and Business Risk? -Evidence of Taiwan`s Banking Industry | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference | 參考文獻\n中文部分\n王文宇, (2007).行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告, 我國上市公司資訊揭露規定之檢討--以公司經營與控制股東之規定為中心.\n李存修、柯承恩,(2002).公司治理與評等系統,商智文化,頁33.\n方嘉麟,(2018).從永豐金案看獨立董事制度,月旦法學雜誌272期,頁9-11.\n\n李明德,(2015). 公司治理, 全球金融風暴和公司舉債:董事會規模對舉債有影響嗎?.台灣管理學刊, 15(2), 25-47.\n黃銘傑,(2005).公司治理與董監民事責任之現狀及課題－以外部董事制度及忠實、注意義務為中心,律師雜誌,第 305 期,頁 19。\n蔡昌憲,(2012).從內控制度及風險管理之國際規範趨勢論我國的公司治理法制：兼論董事監督義務之法律移植,臺大法學論叢,第41,卷第4 期,頁1822。\n楊岳平,( 2019).論金融控股公司治理的改革方向：以獨立董事與提名委員會為中心,臺大法學論叢第 48 卷第 2 期, ,Vol.48, No.2.\n張冠群, (2014).軍法專刊,由銀行之特性論銀行業公司治理中之風險管理機制－\n兼評我國相關法規, 60:2期。\n李智仁, (2006).存款保險資訊季刊, 觀巴塞爾銀行監理委員會「强化銀行公司治理報告(2006年版)」再思我國制度之運作,19:2期, 115-149.\n陳曉蓉,(2003).台灣銀行業公司治理機制與風險承擔行為之關係. 風險管理學報, 5(3), 363-391.\n吳光明,(2005).公司治理與獨立董事，財產法暨經濟法,第 3 期,頁 10-15.\n郭大維. (2012). 我國公開發行公司獨立董事報酬之規範及實證研究. 東吳法律學報, 24(2), 1-34.\n王育琦,(2010).以美國法制論我國獨立董事責任，東海大學法律學研究所碩士論文,頁31.\n黃思嘉,(2000).股權結構與組織策略對銀行信用風險之衝擊. 碩士論文, 國立中央大學財務管理研究所.\n洪秀芬,(2009).企業經營監控機制之法律變遷,國科會「台灣政經轉型下制度變遷」研究計畫之子計畫三，精簡報告版,頁38.\n證券暨期貨市場發展基金會,國際公司治理發展簡訊,2016年,第104期.\n證券交易所公司治理中心新聞稿,2013, 參加「亞洲公司治理協會第13屆年會」看韓國與我國公司治理實務.\n劉紹樑, (2002). 我國公司法制的迷思與挑戰以公司法與金融法規修正為中心.\n金融監督管理委員會(金管會),新版公司治理藍圖(2018~2020).\n賴源河,(2007).監督型董事會存在的必要性,經濟日報.\n賴源河,(2019).少了配套作法的台灣獨立董事制度,工商時報.\n吉伯Gregory D. Gibb, (2002)亞洲企業所有權集中-公司治理難題,經濟日報,第\n4 版.\n\n外文部分\nAgrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 143-161.\nAng, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. the Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106.\nBebchuk, L. A., Kraakman, R., & Triantis, G. (2000). Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity: the mechanisms and agency costs of separating control from cash-flow rights. In Concentrated corporate ownership (pp. 295-318). University of Chicago Press.\nBeiner, S., Drobetz, W., Schmid, M. M., & Zimmermann, H. (2006). An integrated framework of corporate governance and firm valuation. European Financial Management, 12(2), 249-283.\nBrickley, J. A., Lease, R. C., & Smith Jr, C. W. (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of financial economics, 20, 267-291.\nBuser, S. A., Chen, A. H., & Kane, E. J. (1981). Federal deposit insurance, regulatory policy, and optimal bank capital. The journal of Finance, 36(1), 51-60.\nCharles Lee & Jamie Allen(2011).ACGA Taiwan corporate governance white paper。\nCheffins, B., & Bank, S. (2009). Is Berle and Means really a myth?. Business History Review, 443-474.\nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.\nClaessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.\nDou, Y., Sahgal, S., & Zhang, E. J. (2015). Should independent directors have term limits? The role of experience in corporate governance. Financial Management, 44(3), 583-621.\nFaccio, M., & Lang, L. H. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of financial economics, 65(3), 365-395.\nFama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of political economy, 88(2), 288-307.\nFama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.\nFlammer, C., Hong, B., & Minor, D., (2019).Corporate governance and the rise of integrating corporate social responsibility criteria in executive compensation: Effectiveness and implications for firm outcomes. Strategic Management Journal.\nHarvey, C. R., Lins, K. V., & Roper, A. H. (2004). The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme. Journal of financial economics, 74(1), 3-30.\nHelwege, J., Pirinsky, C., & Stulz, R. M. (2007). Why do firms become widely held? An analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership. The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 995-1028.\nJensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360.\nJensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial economics, 11(1-4), 5-50.\nJensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. the Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.\nJiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. I. (2009). Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(5), 819-828.\nJohn, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(4), 371-403.\nKerr, J. L., & Kren, L. (1992). Effect of relative decision monitoring on chief executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 35(2), 370-397.\nKiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2006). Multiple directorships and corporate performance in Australian listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 530-546.\nLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.\nLa Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of financial economics, 58(1-2), 3-27.\nMcConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial economics, 27(2), 595-612.\nMizruchi, M. S. (2004). Berle and Means revisited: The governance and power of large US corporations. Theory and Society, 33(5), 579-617.\nPound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of financial economics, 20, 237-265.\nProwse, S. (1998). Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons From East Asia, Responding to Global Financial Crisis (Washington, DC: The World Bank).\nMizruchi, M. S. (2004). Berle and Means revisited: The governance and power of large US corporations. Theory and Society, 33(5), 579-617.\nRoe, M. J. (1993). Some differences in corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States. The Yale Law Journal, 102(8), 1927-2003.\nSimpson, W. G., & Gleason, A. E. (1999). Board structure, ownership, and financial distress in banking firms. International Review of Economics & Finance, 8(3), 281-292.\nShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of political economy, 94(3, Part 1), 461-488.\nShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.\nSung, S. Y., Choi, J. N., & Kang, S. C. (2017). Incentive pay and firm performance: moderating roles of procedural justice climate and environmental turbulence. Human Resource Management, 56(2), 287-305.\nWilden, R., & Gudergan, S. P. (2015). The impact of dynamic capabilities on operational marketing and technological capabilities: investigating the role of environmental turbulence. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 43(2), 181-199.\nWeisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of financial Economics, 20, 431-460.\nOECD, Board Evaluation: Overview of International Practices, (2018)。\nZahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of management, 15(2), 291-334. | zh_TW |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6814/NCCU202100979 | en_US |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_46ec | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
| item.openairetype | thesis | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105201.pdf | 4.94 MB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.