Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136543
題名: 議事透明對委員會運作之影響分析:以我國第七屆至第九屆立法院為例
Transparency Impacts on the Standing Committee of Legislative Yuan: Seventh to the Ninth Term
作者: 陳宏義
Chen, Hung-Yi
貢獻者: 高永光
陳宏義
Chen, Hung-Yi
關鍵詞: 議事透明
常設委員會
零膨脹負二項迴歸
分配理論
Legislative Transparency
Standing Committee
Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression
Distributive Theories
日期: 2021
上傳時間: 4-Aug-2021
摘要: 國會議員如何去代表他的選區或其選民,甚至如何影響到他的立法行為,一直都是國會研究中的重大課題。Fenno(1977)就提及在經營選區時,除了要做適切的資源分配,也就是配置足夠的人事與資源在選區內進行選民服務外,還有兩項重點工作,包括向選民呈現自己及解釋國會行為。本研究即是希望透過分析我國第七屆到第九屆立法院的常設委員會,來了解議事透明變化對於區域立委在常設委員會立法行為是否產生影響。\n本研究認為,在單一選區選舉制度的驅使下,區域立委會全力爭取選區利益,將好處帶回選區。故區域立委在常設委員會中,會利用委員會的質詢機會,充分表達對選區議題的關心。本研究利用立委在委員會的質詢內容及召集委員安排議程的情形分別從三個層面來進行分析,首先是將每一個常設委員會視為一個整體,進而觀察區域立委在常設委員會當中為選區利益發聲的次數;其次,觀察議事透明是否會對召集委員安排考察議程產生影響;第三層面則是從區域立委個體出發,檢視區域立委是否在委員會為選區利益發聲及議事透明程度的關連性。\n研究分析結果顯示,在委員會的區域立委為選區利益的發言次數上,議事透明相對於議事不透明的情況下,會對區域立委為選區利益發聲的強度產生降低的影響,在零膨脹負二項迴歸模型中呈現顯著性影響。而從常設委員會召集委員議程安排上,發現到對於召集委員安排考察議程有降低的影響,最後,議事透明相對於議事不透明的情況下,同樣會對區域立委發言爭取選區利益有降低的影響。\n整體而言,議事透明有效舒緩分配政治或肉桶政治對於國家發展的負面影響,在本研究的實證分析中獲得支持。而利用立委質詢發言來進行分析研究,甚至引進自動化系統,必能豐富對常設委員會的研究面向。
How members of parliament represent their own constituencies, or, to put it in another way, how their constituencies can affect their votes in the parliaments, has always been a major topic in political science. Fenno (1977) mentions that with respect to constituency management the MPs need to allocate enough human resources to their constituency for the purposes of: a) representing their political ideas, and b) explaining their voting behaviors in the parliament. This dissertation is going to illuminate the question of whether the MPs’ behaviors are indeed affected by their constituencies in the case of the parliamentary procedures of individual standing committees becoming more and more transparent.\nThe author argues that under the system of single member constituency the MPs will do their best for the interest of their constituencies. Therefore, they will show their cares of their constituencies in terms of their questioning opportunities in the standing committees, even if it is absolutely irrelevant to the issues they are debating in the committees. In this work, the author analyses the MP’s questions and the convener’s arrangement of the procedures in three different dimensions: 1) observing how many times the MPs speak for their constituencies in the committees; 2) discerning whether the MPs arrange some agendas of inspection (mostly with some relevant members in the central government) in their constituencies; 3) scrutinizing the connections between the MP’s voices and votes for the interests of their constituencies and the legislative transparency.\nThis works shows that if the parliamentary procedures of certain agenda in the committees is not very transparent to the public, then the MPs will not speak as many times as they can do for their constituencies. The model of zero-inflated negative binominal regression demonstrates the significance of this observation. The same pattern of behavior also happens to the case of the convenors’ arranging the trips for inspections in their constituencies. Lastly, if the parliamentary procedures are opaque, the MPs will be less willing to speak for their own constituencies.\nIn conclusion, the empirical data and conceptual analysis in this work corroborate that the implementation of legislative transparency can alleviate the negative effect on the country’s development which pork barrel and distribution politics bring about. Introducing automation of analyzing the MPs behaviors can definitely enrich the future research on the standing committees in the parliament.
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描述: 博士
國立政治大學
政治學系
101252502
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101252502
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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