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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/136916| 題名: | 家庭照顧倫理初探：從特殊義務轉向家庭關係中的「我們」 Inquiry on Ethics of Family Care: An Ethical Turn from Special Obligations to "We" in Family Relations |
作者: | 陳薈雅 Chen, Huei-Ya |
貢獻者: | 林遠澤 Lin, Yuan-Tse 陳薈雅 Chen, Huei-Ya |
關鍵詞: | 家庭照顧 特殊義務 肯認 依靠 倫理生活 關係性主體 Family Care Special Obligations Recognition Dependency Ethical Life Relational Subject |
日期: | 2021 | 上傳時間: | 2-九月-2021 | 摘要: | 家庭照顧作為當代家庭倫理的核心議題，除了在護理及醫療的專業領域中有相關的討論及理論建設外，鮮少有哲學論述觸及此一主題。因而，本文嘗試從家庭照顧的經驗現象出發，以揭示家庭照顧作為一倫理學課題如何關聯於倫理生活的創造，並藉由釐清家庭在倫理學上的意涵以形成思考家庭照顧的哲學基礎，從而開展一條探究家庭照顧倫理的進路。據此，本文旨在探究「我們作為關係性主體如何可能在家庭照顧中朝向好的倫理生活追求」，而非建立關於家庭照顧的道德規則。\n\n本文主要涉及特殊義務論、Honneth的肯認理論及Kittay的依靠理論對家庭的相關論述，並以此形成探究家庭照顧倫理的哲學資源。本文首先將指出特殊義務論如何提供家庭作為個人關係的道德反思基礎，並從而轉向思索家庭作為實踐的倫理領域。再者，從家庭的現代性反省中指出家庭如何作為交織在情感與正義張力間的倫理領域，並藉由肯認理論與依靠理論對家庭的構思，分別在前理論的制度領域與前制度的生命領域層次上回應家庭的現代性處境，從而構成家庭倫理生活的理念。最後，本文將指出家庭照顧的實踐如何交織在倫理生活中自足性與脆弱性的張力間，並藉由對關係性主體的詮釋以理解之。\n\n本文主張家庭照顧倫理的探究應當從證成個別的特殊義務轉向思索關係性的「我們」如何可能，才能回應「我們應該如何而活」的倫理學核心問題，以面對家庭照顧所帶出的情感／正義以及自足性／脆弱性的問題。本文希望能為家庭照顧倫理提供一個合適的探究角度，以指出照顧在家庭倫理生活中的真正內涵。 | 參考文獻: | Belliotti, R. A. (1986). Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother and To Thine Own Self Be True. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24(2), 149–162.\nBetzler, Monika & Löschke, Jörg (2016). New Developments in Family Ethics: An Introduction. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13 (6), 641-651.\nBlum, Lawrence A. (2005). 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資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107154001 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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