中國一胎化政策的「失蹤女性」效應

Abstract

中國的性別失衡問題，廣被學界關注。先前許多研究認為，性別鑑定技術的進步，係造成發展中國家新生兒性比例失衡的重要原因。在「一胎化」政策廣泛推行的1980年代，中國官方投入了大量的節育資源，但相較於城市，農村分配到的醫療資源有限，也因此，涉及性別選擇的墮胎技術在農村並不常見。在這樣的情況下，為何中國農村仍出現嚴重的性別失衡？其次，為何有些地區的性別失衡，遠比其他地區嚴重？\n\n為了解答這些問題，本文提出一個威權政體生育治理的解釋，分別從宏觀、中觀、微觀層次進行分析。首先，在宏觀層次，我們借用碎裂威權主義的概念，解釋政治菁英與技術官僚在「一胎化」決策過程的互動，討論這個生育政策如何致使地方反彈，導致加劇性別失衡的非預期政策結果。其次，在中觀層次，我們建立了一個「中央與地方」關係互動過程的賽局模型，解釋基層官僚受到來自中央生育指標的高度壓力，使其有誘因提供家庭性別鑑定工具，換取其遵守節育政策，避免節育失敗的政治懲罰。最後，在微觀層面，我們利用人口普查資料與歷史資料建立了縣級資料庫，探討為何有些農村地區的性別失衡情形比其他地區更嚴重。我們假設當一個農村地區引進性別鑑定工具後，如果該地區的黨國控制基層生育能力愈強，則會出現愈嚴重的性別失衡。我們的實證分析支持了這個假設，且結果相當穩健。\n\n整體而言，本論文對社會科學的跨領域研究有兩個主要貢獻：一、就人口學而言，本研究證實了性別鑑定的創新技術與黨國建制對於理解威權政體的性別失衡問題有相當大的重要性；二、就威權政治研究而言，本論文建構一個賽局模型、並進行系統性的實證分析，為中國強制性生育政策的起源與後果提供有力的解釋。

Sex ratio imbalance in China has increasingly drawn scholarly attention. Many previous studies argue that the improvement of sex identification techniques is a crucial explanatory factor for the imbalance of China`s sex ratio at birth. During the 1980s, Chinese government had promoted the One-Child Policy by investing a significant amount of birth control resources. However, because medical resources were unevenly distributed, abortion techniques that involved sex identification were rare in the rural areas. Under this situation, why did serious sex ratio imbalance occur in China’s rural areas? In addition, why were some rural areas’ sex ratio imbalance more serious than others?\n\nTo address these questions, this dissertation provides an explanation about fertility governance in authoritarian regimes, using macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level perspectives for analyses. First of all, at the macro-level, we use the concept of fragmented authoritarianism to explain the interactions between political elites and technocrats in the decision-making process of the One-Child-Policy. We discuss how this fertility policy was resisted by the local people and resulted in the unintended consequence of worsening sex ratio imbalance. Second, at the meso-level, we build a formal model of interactions between the central government and the local governments. In this game-theoretic model, we explain that the pressures from the central government for achieving fertility policy goals had created incentives for the local bureaucrats to avoid political punishment by providing sex identification tools in exchange of people`s compliance with the birth control policy. Third, at the micro-level, we build a county-level dataset to examine why sex ratio imbalance was more serious in some rural areas but not others. We hypothesize that after sex identification techniques were introduced, a county will have higher levels of sex ratio imbalance if it has a stronger local party-state structure for fertility control. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis, and the results are robust across different model specifications.\n\nOverall, this dissertation makes two contributions across different social science disciplines. First, it contributes to the literature on population research by showing the importance of sex-identification technical innovation and party-state structure for understanding sex ratio imbalance in authoritarian political contexts. Second, it enriches theories of authoritarian politics by providing a game-theoretic model and systematic empirical analyses to explain the origins and consequences of the compulsory fertility policy in China.