Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137124
題名: 為孔子學院制定外交策略以推廣印尼的中國文化: 從軟實力到銳實力?
Strategizing Confucius Institutes in the Promotion of China`s Cultural Diplomacy in Indonesia: From Soft Power to Sharp Power?
作者: 慕白
Mubah, Ahmad Safril
貢獻者: 楊昊
Alan Hao Yang
慕白
Ahmad Safril Mubah
關鍵詞: 中國的權力行為
中國文化
孔子學院
文化外交
普通話
地方網絡
正面形象
銳實力
軟實力
China’s power behaviors
Chinese culture
Confucius Institutes
cultural diplomacy
Mandarin language
local networks
positive image
sharp power
soft power
日期: 2021
上傳時間: 2-Sep-2021
摘要: 本研究探討了中華人民共和國 (PRC) 在印度尼西亞開展孔子學院 (CIs) 以促進普通話和中國文化的戰略。此前的多項研究發現,CIs 展示了中國文化軟實力,提升了中國的正面形象。作為中國文化外交的代理人,孔子學院在促進中國與學院所在國的文化交流方面發揮著重要作用。相比之下,其他學術文獻則認為 CIs 將中國的軟實力變成了銳實力。中國被指控行使 CIs 以傳播其政治意識形態和操縱有關中國的信息。在世界特定地區對 CIs 的強烈反對之際,這些研究所在東南亞國家受到了真正的歡迎。印度尼西亞的 CIs 展示了一個特殊案例,區別於其他國家的類似案例。儘管印度尼西亞存在反華情緒,但該國的 CIs 數量在過去幾年中有所增加。\n因此,本研究對於考察中國在印尼推進文化外交的權力行為具有重要意義。 回顧了有關中國文化外交軟實力與銳實力之爭的學術文獻,認為以往的研究忽視了中國保持自身特色來行使權力的事實。 文獻傾向於概括中國的權力行為,而沒有考慮特定國家的具體案例。 這項研究發現,中國正在使用 CIs 來削弱印度尼西亞的銳實力。 它提出了一個問題,印度尼西亞的CIs如何發揮其作為中國文化外交代理人的作用,以軟化中國的銳實力?\n為了解答這個難題,本研究運用中國權力行為、中國公共和文化外交以及 CI 跨國網絡的框架來分析從書籍、期刊、工作論文、政府報告、雜誌、報紙和採訪中收集的數據。 文章認為,在對中國銳實力崛起的擔憂日益加劇的情況下,印度尼西亞的獨聯體正在採取兩種策略,通過尊重印尼本土文化和擴大本土網絡來軟化它。 這一論點得到以下研究結果的支持。 第一,印尼CIs通過迴避涉及印尼-中國雙邊關係的敏感問題,展示中國文化與印尼本土文化的融合,提升中國的正面形象。 其次,印度尼西亞的孔子學院正在通過擴大教育機構、當地社區、商業團體和政府機構的網絡參與來擴大中國的正面形象。\n本研究通過突出印度尼西亞 CIs 當地案例的變化,提供了印度尼西亞國家案例的一般特徵和詳細分析。 結論是,與中國敵對國家因意識形態和政治問題而對立的獨聯體不同,印度尼西亞等中國夥伴國的獨聯體因其在增進中印尼相互了解、軟化中國銳實力方面發揮了重要作用而得到了許多利益相關者的支持。 印度尼西亞的 CIs 不僅是一個外語機構,而且還是中國隱性宣傳的代理人,它行使中國的不僅僅是軟實力,而不是其尖銳的權力行為,以服務於中國的政治利益。 這是推動中國文化外交軟實力與銳實力之爭的新證據。
This research explores the strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to exercise Confucius Institutes (CIs) for promoting Mandarin language and Chinese culture in Indonesia. A number of previous studies have found that the CIs have displayed Chinese cultural soft power to improve China’s positive image. As the PRC’s agents of cultural diplomacy, the CIs are playing an important role in facilitating cultural exchanges between China and the institutes’ host countries. In contrast, other scholarly literature contends that the CIs have turned China’s soft power into sharp power. The PRC is accused of exercising the CIs for disseminating its political ideology and manipulating information about China. Amid the growing backlash against the CIs in particular regions of the world, the institutes have been truly welcomed in Southeast Asian countries. The CIs in Indonesia demonstrate a special case distinguished from similar cases in other countries. Despite the existing anti-China sentiment in Indonesia, the number of CIs in this country has increased over the last few years.\nThis research, therefore, is significant for investigating China’s power behaviors in promoting its cultural diplomacy in Indonesia. It reviews the scholarly literature of the debate between soft power and sharp power in China’s cultural diplomacy through the operations of the CIs and suggests that the prior studies have neglected the fact that China has maintained its own characteristics to exercise its power. The literature tends to generalize about China’s power behaviors without considering the specific cases in particular countries. This research finds that China is employing the CIs to soften sharp power in Indonesia. It asks the question of how do Indonesian CIs play their role as agents of China’s cultural diplomacy in softening China’s sharp power?\nTo answer the puzzle, this research applies frameworks of China’s power behaviors, China’s public and cultural diplomacy, and CIs transnational networks to analyze data gathered from books, journals, working papers, government reports, magazines, newspapers, and interviews. It argues that amid the growing concerns on the rise of China’s sharp power, the Indonesian CIs are adopting two strategies in softening it by respecting Indonesian local culture and expanding local networks. This argument is supported by the following findings. First, the Indonesian CIs are promoting China’s positive image by avoiding sensitive issues for Indonesia-China bilateral relations and exhibiting hybridization of Chinese culture and Indonesian local culture. Second, the Indonesian CIs are expanding China’s positive image by getting engaged with broadening networks of educational institutions, local communities, business groups, and government agencies.\nThis research provides general features and detailed analysis within Indonesian national case by highlighting variations of local cases at Indonesian CIs. It concludes that unlike the CIs in China’s rival countries that are opposed because of ideology and political issues, CIs in China’s partner country like Indonesia are supported by many stakeholders for their significant role in improving mutual understanding between China and Indonesia to soften China’s sharp power. The Indonesian CIs are not just a foreign language institution but also agents of China’s implicit propaganda that exercises China’s more than just soft power rather than its sharp power behaviors to serve the PRC’s political interests. This is new evidence that contributes to the debate between soft power and sharp power in the promotion of China’s cultural diplomacy.
參考文獻: Books\nBabbie, Earl, 2013. The Practice of Social Research (13th Edition). Belmont: Wadsworth.\nBijian, Zheng, 2005. China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian (1997-2005). Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.\nBlusse, Johan Leonard, 1981. Batavia 1619-1740. The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nCreswell, John W. and J. David Creswell, 2018. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative & Mixed Methods Approaches (5th Edition). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Inc.\nCreswell, John W., 2013. Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches (3rd Edition). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Inc.\nCull, Nicholas J. 2009. Public Diplomacy: Lesson from the Past. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.\nCummings, Milton C., 2003. Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey. Washington, D.C.: Center for Arts and Culture.\nDawis, Aimee, 2010. The Chinese of Indonesia and Their Search for Identity: The Relationship between Collective Memory and the Media. New York: Cambria Press.\nDieleman, Marleen, Juliette Koning, and Peter Post, 2011. “Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change: Alternative Perspectives,” in Dieleman, Marleen, Juliette Koning, and Peter Post (Eds.), 2011. Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, pp. 3-22.\nGil, Jeffrey, 2017. Soft Power and the Worldwide Promotion of Chinese Language Learning: The Confucius Institute Project. Bristol, UK: St. Nicholas House.\nGlaser, Bonnie S. and Melissa E. Murphy, 2009 “Soft Power with Chinese characteristics: The Ongoing Debate,” in McGiffert, Carola (Ed.), 2009. Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, pp. 10–26.\nHanban, 2018. Confucius Institute Annual Development Report, 2016. Beijing: Hanban.\nHartig, Falk, 2016. Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Rise of the Confucius Institute. New York: Routledge.\nHew, Wai Eng, 2018. Chinese Ways of Being Muslim: Negotiating Ethnicity and Religiosity in Indonesia. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press.\nHsiao, H.H. Michael and Alan H. Yang, 2019. “Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia: Assessing the New Trends in China’s Soft Diplomacy,” in Diokno, Maria Selena I., H.H. Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang (Eds.), 2019. China’s Footprints in Southeast Asia. Singapore: NUS Press, pp. 194-225.\nIfekwunigwe, Jayne O., 1999. “Old Whine, New Vassals: Are Diaspora and Hybridity Postmodern Inventions?,” in Cohen, Phil (Ed.), 1999. New Ethnicities, Old Racisms? Racisms?. London: Zed Books, pp. 180-204.\nKeck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. New York: Cornell University Press.\nKitano, Mitsuru, 2007. “What Is Public Diplomacy?” in Kaneko, Maafumi and Mitsuru Kitano (Eds.), 2007. Public Diplomacy. Tokyo: PHP.\nKurlantzick, Joshua, 2007. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World. New Haven: Yale University Press.\nKvale, Steinar, 1996. InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Thousand Oaks: Sage.\nLai, Hongyi “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power,” in Lai, Hongyi and Yiyi Lu (Eds.), 2012. China’s Soft Power and International Relations. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 83-103.\nLai, Hongyi, 2012. “Introduction: The Soft Power Concept and A Rising China,” in Lai, Hongyi and Yiyi Lu (Eds.), 2012. China’s Soft Power and International Relations. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1-20.\nLampton, David M., 2008. The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.\nLee, Sook Jong and Jan Melissen, 2011. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia. Palgrave Macmillan.\nMalone, Giffort D., 1988. Political Advocacy and Cultural Communications: Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy. Lanham: University Press of America.\nMarshall, Catherine and Gretchen B. Rossman, 2011. Designing Qualitative Research (5th Edition). Thousand Oaks: SAGE.\nNeuman, W. Lawrence, 2014. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (7th Edition). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.\nNobuhiro Aizawa, 2011. “Assimilation, Differentiation, and Depoliticization: Chinese Indonesia and the Ministry of Home Affairs in Suharto’s Indonesia,” in Dieleman, Marleen, Juliette Koning, and Peter Post (Eds.), 2011. Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.\nNye, Joseph S., 2004. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.\nSlaughter, Anne-Marie, 2004. A New World Order. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.\nSukma, Rizal, 2002. “The Indonesia’s Perception of China: The Domestic Bases of Persistent Ambiguity,” in Yee, Herbert and Ian Storey (Eds.), 2002. China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. London: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 183-187.\nSuryadinata, Leo, 2012. Southeast Asian Personalities of Chinese Descent: A Biographical Dictionary. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.\nTaylor, Philip M., 1997. Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945. London/New York: Routledge\nWang, Jian, 2011. “Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power,” in Wang, Jian, 2011. Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-18.\nYee, Herbert and Ian Storey, 2002. “Introduction,” in Yee, Herbert and Ian Storey (Eds.), 2002. China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality. London: RoutledgeCurzon.\nZaharna, Rhonda, 2004. “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” in Snow, Nancy and Yahya R. Kamalipour (Eds.), 2004. War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 219-225.\nZhang, Guozuo, 2017. Research Outline for China’s Cultural Soft Power. Singapore: Social Science Academic Press and Springer Nature Singapore Ltd.\n\nJournals\nChang, Chia-Chien and Alan H. Yang, 2000. “Weaponized Interdependence: China’s Economic Statecraft and Social Penetration against Taiwan,” Orbis, 64 (2): 312-333.\nChinh, Nguyen Van, 2014. “Confucius Institutes in the Mekong Region: China`s Soft Power or Soft Border?,” Issues & Studies, 50 (4): 85-117.\nCull, Nicholas J., 2008. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616 (1): 31-54.\nDahl, Robert A., 1957. “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 2 (3): 201-215.\nBicard, Danielly Silva Ramos and Paulo Menechelli Filho, 2019. “Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China’s Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century,” Revista Brasileira de Politica International, 62 (1): 1-20.\nBroomfield, Emma V., 2003. “Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory,” Journal of Contemporary China, 12 (35): 265-284.\nGilboa, Eytan, 2008. “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616 (1): 55-77.\nHartig, Falk, 2012. “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17: 53-76.\nHoon, Chang Yau, 2006. “Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity: The Dilemmas of Ethnic Chinese in Post Suharto Indonesia.” Asian Ethnicity, 7 (2): 149-166.\nHsiao, H.H. Michael and Alan H. Yang, 2014. “Differentiating the Politics of Dependency: Confucius Institute in Cambodia and Myanmar,” Issues & Studies, 50 (4): 1-10.\nKeohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, 1974. “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics, 27 (1): 39-62.\nLan, Thung Ju, 2017. “Confucius Institute at Universitas Al Azhar, Jakarta: The Unseen Power of China,” Wacana, 18 (1): 148-182.\nLi, Mingjiang, 2008. “China Debates Soft Power,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 (2): 287-308.\nLiu, Xin, 2019. “China’s Cultural Diplomacy: A Great Leap Outward with Chinese Characteristics? Multiple Comparative Case Studies of the Confucius Institutes,” Journal of Contemporary China, 28 (118): 646-661.\nLo, Joe Tin-yau and Suyan Pan, 2014. “Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power: Practices and Paradoxes,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, pp. 1-21.\nMark, Simon L., 2010. “Rethinking Cultural Diplomacy: The Cultural Diplomacy of New Zealand, the Canadian Federation and Quebec,” Political Science, 62 (1): 62-83.\nNye, Joseph S., 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616 (1): 94-109.\nNye, Joseph S., 2012. “China and Soft Power,” South African Journal of\nInternational Affairs, 19 (2): 151-155.\nOng, Aihwa, 2003. “Cyberpublics and Diaspora Politics among Transnational Chinese.” Interventions, 5 (1): 82-100.\nPan, Su-Yan, 2013. “Confucius Institute Project: China`s Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection,” Asian Education and Development Studies, 2 (1): 22-33.\nPapastergiadis, Nikos, 2005. “Hybridity and Ambivalence: Places and Fows in Contemporary Art and Culture” Theory, Culture and Society, 22 (4): 39-64.\nRawnsley, Gary, 2012. “Approach to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China and Taiwan,” Journal of International Communication, 18 (2): 121-135.\nRoy, Denny, 1996. “The “China Threat” Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey, 36 (8): 758-771.\nSetijadi, Charlotte, 2016. “‘A Beautiful Bridge’: Chinese Indonesian Associations, Social Capital and Strategic Identification in a New Era of China–Indonesia Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, 25 (102): 822-835.\nShuto, Motoko, 2018. “Patterns and Views of China’s Public Diplomacy in\nASEAN Countries: Focusing on Confucius Institutes,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 7 (2): 124-148.\nSingh, Mandip, 2018. “From Smart Power to Sharp Power: How China Promotes her National Interests,” Journal of Defence Studies, 12 (3): 5-25.\nSlaughter, Anne-Marie and David Zaring, 2006. “Networking Goes International: An Update,” Annual Review of Law and Science, 2: 211-229.\nTheo, Rika and Maggie W. Leung, 2018. “China’s Confucius Institute in Indonesia: Mobility, Frictions and Local Surprises,” Sustainability, 10 (12): 1-15.\nTungkeunkunt, Kornphanat, 2016. “Culture and Commerce: China’s Soft Power in Thailand,” International Journal of China Studies, 7 (2): 151-173.\nWu Ying, 2016. “Review of the Confucius Institutes’ Strategy for the\nDissemination of Chinese Culture,” Chinese Education & Society, 49 (6): 391-401.\nYang, Alan H. and H.H. Michael Hsiao, 2012. “Confucius Institutes and the Question of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy,” China Brief, 8 (3): 10-13.\nYang, Rui, 2010. “Soft Power and Higher Education: An Examination of China’s Confucius Institutes,” Globalisation, Societies and Education, 8 (2): 235-245.\nZhang, Min, 2016. “The Rationale and Strategy behind China’s Foreign Aid towards Its Southeastern Neighbors,” International Journal of Education and Social Science, 3 (12): 46-50.\nZhou, Ying and Sabrina Luk, 2016. “Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Promoting China’s Soft Power?,” Journal of Contemporary China, 25 (100): 628-642.\n\n\nInterviews\nInterview with the Director of the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (DCI-4), 2020 (February 5).\nInterview with the Director of the Confucius Institute at March Eleventh University (DCI-3), 2020 (February 4).\nInterview with the Director of the Confucius Institute at Surabaya State University (DCI-1), 2018 (May 31).\nInterview with the Director of the Confucius Institute at Surabaya State University (DCI-2), 2020 (January 24).\nInterview with the Director of the Confucius Institute at University of Al Azhar Indonesia (DCI-5), 2020 (October 5).\nInterview with the Student affiliated with the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (SCI-3), 2020 (February 6).\nInterview with the Student affiliated with the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (SCI-4), 2020 (February 6).\nInterview with the Student of the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (SCI-5), 2020 (February 6).\nInterview with the Student of the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (SCI-6), 2020 (February 6).\nInterview with the Student of the Confucius Institute at Surabaya State University (SCI-1), 2020 (February 1).\nInterview with the Student of the Confucius Institute at Surabaya State University (SCI-2), 2020 (February 1).\nInterview with the Teacher of the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (TCI-1), 2020 (February 6).\nInterview with the Teacher of the Confucius Institute at Malang State University (TCI-2), 2020 (February 6).\n\nWorking Papers\nCull, Nicholas J., 2009. “Statement of Dr. Nicholas J. Cull, Professor of Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA,” in Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing: China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, April 30. Washington: United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5–17. Retrieved December 8, 2019 from https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/USCC%202009%20Apr.pdf.\nFossati, Diego, Hui Yew Foong, and Siwage Dharma Negara, 2017. “The Indonesia National Survey Project: Economy, Society and Politics,” ISEAS Trends in Southeast Asia, No. 10. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.\nSetijadi, Charlotte, 2017. “Chinese Indonesians in the Eyes of Pribumi Public,” ISEAS Perspective, No. 73, September 27.\nWalker, Christopher and Jessica Ludwig, 2017. “From ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Sharp Power’: Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World,” Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. National Endowment for Democracy Report. Retrieved November 10, 2019 from https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian -Influence-FullReport.pdf\nXiang, Jun and Wei Hao Huang, 2015. “What Determines China’s Allocation of Confucius Institute: Educational, Political, or Economic Interest?,” Working Paper. New Jersey: Economics and Global Affairs, Rutgers University.\n\nGovernment Official Reports\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), 2016. Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2015 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2015]. Retrieved June 16, 2019 from https:// www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/file_siaran_pers/ Bahan_Paparan_-_IND_-_Realisasi_ Investasi_Q4_2015_dan_Jan_-_Des_2015.pdf.\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), (2017). Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2016 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2016]. Retrieved June 16, 2019 from https:// www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/ file_siaran_pers/Bahan_Paparan_TW_IV_2016.pdf.\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), 2018. Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2017 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2017]. Retrieved June 16, 2019 from https://www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/file_siaran_pers/ Paparan_Indonesia_TW_IV_-_2017_Kepala.pdf.\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), 2019. Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2018 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2018]. Retrieved June 16, 2019 from https://www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/file_siaran_pers/ Paparan_Bahasa_Indonesia_Press_Release_TW_IV_2018.pdf.\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), 2020. Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2019 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2019]. Retrieved January 18, 2021 https://www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/file_siaran_pers/ Paparan_Bahasa_Indonesia_Press_Release_TW_IV_2019.pdf.\nBadan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM, Investment Coordinating Board of Republic of Indonesia), 2021. Realisasi Penananaman Modal PMDN–PMA, Triwulan IV dan Januari–Desember 2020 [Realization of Investment, Quarter 4 and January–December 2020]. Retrieved April 26, 2021 https://www.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/file_siaran_pers/ Paparan_Bahasa_Indonesia_Press_Release_TW_IV_2020.pdf.\nBadan Pusat Statistik (National Statistics Bureau), 2011. Kewarganegaraan, Suku Bangsa, Agama, dan Bahasa Sehari-hari Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010. Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik.\nKementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia (Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia), 2020. Neraca Perdagangan dengan Mitra Dagang [Trade Balance with Trading Partners]. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://statistik.kemendag.go.id/balance-of-trade-with-trade-partner-country.\n\nMagazines and Newspapers\nKompas, 2012. “Al Azhar Bangun Pusat Bahasa Mandarin,” November 9. Retrieved December 21, 2020 from https://edukasi.kompasuai.com/read/2012/11/09/12174472/ Al.Azhar.Bangun.Pusat.Bahasa.Mandarin.\nKompas, 2017. “Eddie Lembong, Tokoh Farmasi dan Persatuan Tanah Air Meninggal Dunia,” November 2. Retrieved December 31, 2020 from https://biz.kompas.com/read/2017/11/02/ 142051828/eddie-lembong-tokoh-farmasi-dan-persatuan-tanah-air-meninggal-dunia.\nKoran Solo, “PMS Serahkan 20.000 Paket Sembako,” July 19, 2020.Retrieved January 4, 2021 from http://www.koransolo.co/2020/07/19/pms-serahkan-20-000-paket-sembako/.\nNew Strait Times, 2014. “Growing Influence of Confucius Institutes,” October 2. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/growing-influence-confucius-institutes.\nNye, Joseph S., 2018. “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence,” Foreign Affairs, January 24. Retrieved November 30, 2019 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power.\nPeople’s Daily Online, 2011. “China to further education cooperation with Indonesia: Premier Wen,” April 30. Retrieved January 7, 2021 from http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/ 90883/7366418.html.\nShambaugh, David, 2015. “China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,” Foreign Affairs, July/August. Retrieved December 28, 2017 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push.\nTaiwan News, 2020. “China’s Confucius Institute Renamed amid Global Backlash,”, July 6. Retrieved July 6, 2020 from https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3960842.\nThe Economist, 2017. “Sharp Power,” December 16-22, p. 9.\nThe Economist, 2017. “At the Sharp End,” December 16-22, pp. 17-19.\nThe Epoch Times, 2015. “Confucius Classroom Draws Controversy for Embedding Communist Ideology,” October 1. Retrieved December 28, 2017 from https://www.theepochtimes.com/confucius-confucius-classroom-program-chinese-basketba ll-star-tiananmen-square-massacre-ccp_1512902.html.\nThe Jakarta Post, 2021. “More Sinovac Vaccine Arrives in Indonesia ahead of Vaccination Drive,” January 12. Retrieved January 19, 2021 from https://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2021/01/12/more-sinovac-vaccine-arrives-in-indonesia-ahead-of-vaccination-drive.ht ml.\nWalker, Christopher and Jessica Ludwig, 2017. “The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence,” Foreign Affairs, November 16. Retrieved September 26, 2019 from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power.\n\n\nOnline Articles\nAntara, 2019. “Belasan Sekolah Tiga Bahasa mengikuti Porseni Perstibi di Yogyakarta,” November 1. Retrieved December 24, 2020 from https://jogja.antaranews.com/berita/ 400319/belasan-sekolah-tiga-bahasa-mengikuti-porseni-i-perstibi-di-yogyakarta.\nBelford, Aubrey, 2012. “Communists in the Classroom?,” The Global Mail, March 1. Retrieved December 27, 2017 from http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/communists-in-theclassroom/ 97/.\nBrown, Katherine, 2017. “Challenges in Measuring Public Diplomacy,” The Soft Power 30, August 2, Retrieved October 8, 2017 from https://softpower30.com/challenges-in-measuring-public-diplomacy/.\nChina.org, 2007. “Full text of Hu’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” October 25. Retrieved December 9, 2017 from http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.\nChina.org, 2012. “Full text of Hu’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” November 18. Retrieved December 9, 2017 from http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/ content_27137540.htm.\nChina.org, 2017. “Full text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” November 3. Retrieved December 9, 2017 from http://www.china.org.cn/20171105-002. pdf.\nChinese Consulate General in Surabaya, 2012. “Mr. Wang Resmikan Confucius Institute,” December 27. Retrieved December 26, 2017 from http://surabaya.china-consulate.org/ indo/lgdt/t995360.htm.\nDewi, Anitasa, 2019. “Mandarin sebagai Representasi Budaya Tiongkok.” Retrieved January 4, 2021 from https://china.uai.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Mandarin-sebagai-Representasi-Budaya-Tiongkok.pdf.\nEmbassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2007. “First Confucius Institute in Indonesia established at the Jakarta Chinese Language Teaching Center,” December 27. Retrieved December 26, 2017 from http://id.china-embassy.org/ eng/whjy/lxxx/t393549.htm.\nHanban, 2007. “Provisional Regulations for Administering the Funds of Confucius Institutes.” Retrieved December 29, 2017 from http://www.hanbanonline.com/cnews/announce/ show.php?announceid=10.\nHanban, 2007. “Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” Retrieved October 1, 2020 from http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm.\nHanban, 2007. “Guidance to Establish A Confucius Institute /An Independent Confucius Classroom (Revised).” Retrieved October 14, 2020 from http://english.hanban.org/ node_7879.htm.\nHanban, 2007. “Regulations for the Administration of Confucius Institute Headquarters Funds.” Retrieved October 14, 2020 from http://english.hanban.org/node_7878.htm.\nHanban, 2007. “Guide for Confucius Institute Deans.” Retrieved October 14, 2020 from http://english.hanban.org/node_7877.htm.\nHanban News, 2011. “Chinese Language Teacher Development Center at the Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at University of Al Azhar Indonesia Holds a MOU Signing Ceremony in Jakarta,” January 18. Retrieved January 12, 2021 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2011-01/18/content_222285.htm.\nHanban News, 2011. “Highlights of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s Visit to Confucius Institute at the University of Al-Azhar, Indonesia,” April 29. Retrieved December 28, 2017 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2011-04/29/content_257863.htm.\nHanban News, 2012. “Farewell Ceremony Held by Ministry of Education and Culture, Indonesia for First Batch of Full-time Chinese Teachers of Indonesia Secondary Schools Who Will Leave for Studies in China,” July 25. Retrieved January 7, 2021 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2012-07/25/content_450449.htm.\nHanban News, 2014. “Delegation led by Deputy Director General of Hanban Wang Yongli visits Confucius Institute at National University of Surabaya, Indonesia,” June 25. Retrieved September 30, 2019 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2014-06/25/ content_542501.htm.\nHanban News, 2012. “Director-General of Hanban Xu Lin and Representative of the Minister of Education and Culture of Indonesia Signs a Cooperation Agreement,” April 28. Retrieved January 7, 2021 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2012-04/28/content_ 431010.htm.\nHanban News, 2012. “Indonesian Ambassador to China Visits the Confucius Institute at the University of Al-Azhar,” September 29. Retrieved December 21, 2020 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2012-09/29/content_465800.htm.\nHanban News, 2015. “Vice Premier Liu Yandong visits Pusat Bahasa Mandarin at Maranatha Christian University, Indonesia,” June 12. Retrieved January 11, 2021 from http://english.hanban.org/article/2015-06/12/content_604322.htm.\nHebei Normal University, 2015. “我校印尼孔子学院荣获“全球先进孔子学院”奖,” December 11. Retrieved January 12, 2021 from http://www.hebtu.edu.cn/a/2015/12/11/ 20151211145512.html.\nHuang, Xilian, 2019. “China and ASEAN Doing Well on Economic, Trade Cooperation,” The Jakarta Post, January 21. Retrieved January 18, 2021 from https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/01/31/china-and-asean-doing-well-on-economic-trade-cooperation.html.\nNational Association of Scholars, “How Many Confucius Institutes Are in the United States?,” April 14, 2021. Retrieved April 21, 2021 from https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/ how_many_confucius_institutes_are_in_the_united_states.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Negeri Malang, 2018. “第二届中印尼友谊合唱比赛通知,” February 23. Retrieved January 25, 2021 from http://yinnimalang.id.chinesecio.com/ zh-hans/node/676.\nUniversitas Al Azhar Indonesia, 2012. “Peresmian Pusat Bahasa Mandarin dan Peluncuran Buku Burhan Uray ““Berbakti Untuk Indonesia” November 13. Retrieved January 12, 2021 from https://fib.uai.ac.id/blog/peresmian-pusat-bahasa-mandarin-dan-peluncuran-buku-burhan-uray-berbakti-untuk-indonesia/.\nUniversitas Al Azhar Indonesia, 2017. “Tentang Program Studi Bahasa Mandarin dan Budaya Tiongkok.” Retrieved January 14, 2021 from https://china.uai.ac.id/tentang/.\nUniversitas Hasanuddin, 2016. “The First OPPO Company “Business Chinese Intensive Class” Starts at the CI at Hasanuddin University,” April 28. Retrieved May 6, 2020 from http://pbmunhas.id.chinesecio.com/zh-hans/node/122.\nUniversitas Hasanuddin, 2017. “Pusat Bahasa Mandarin Unhas Berkembang Luar Biasa,” 22 February. Retrieved January 4, 2021 from https://unhas.ac.id/article/title/pusat-bahasa-mandarin-unhas-berkembang-luar-biasa.\nUniversitas Hasanuddin, 2019. “Sejarah Prodi,” Retrieved January 4, 2021 http://ilmubudaya.unhas.ac.id/mandarin/tentang-kami/.\nUniversitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2016. “UMM Buka China Corner,” May 19. Retrieved January 4, 2021 from http://www.umm.ac.id/id/berita/umm-buka-china-corner.html.\nUniversitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2016. “UMM-CI China Strengthen Strategic Partnership,” June 24. Retrieved January 4, 2021 from http://www.umm.ac.id/en/umm-news-4927-umm-confucius-institute-cina-perkuat-kemitraanstrategis.html.\nUniversitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2018. “Confucius Institute China Siap Sertifikasi Ketrampilan Bahasa Mandarin Mahasiswa UMM,” March 2. Retrieved January 4, 2021 from http://www.umm.ac.id/id/berita/confusius-institute-china-siap-sertifikasi-ketrampilan -bahasa-mandarin-mahasiswa-umm.html.\nUniversitas Negeri Malang, 2018. “Cultural Acculturation, Unifying Nation and Country,” September 30. Retrieved January 11, 2021 from http://oia.um.ac.id/cultural-acculturation-unifying-nation-and-country/.\nUniversitas Negeri Malang, 2019. “Duta Besar Tiongkok Kunjungi Pusat Bahasa Mandarin dan Lab. Central FMIPA UM,” March 18. Retrieved January 11, 2021 from https://um.ac.id/berita/duta-besar-tiongkok-kunjungi-pusat-bahasa-mandarin-dan-lab-centr al-fmipa-um/.\nUniversitas Negeri Malang, 2020. “Bersama Satgas Covid-19 UM, PBM UM Serahkan Donasi ke RSUD Kepanjen,” July 20. Retrieved December 31, 2020 from https://um.ac.id/berita/bersama-satgas-covid-19-um-pbm-um-serahkan-donasi-ke-rsud-kepanjen/?fbclid=IwAR3w0ozhMt gYz4N3d5c-nVyphfnxhqy5Re7bV1luZaF0XfUj0Nve4n8nsC8.\nUniversitas Negeri Malang, 2020. “[Open Registration] – Chinese Language and Culture Classes,” August 31. Retrieved September 8, 2020 from http://oia.um.ac.id/?p=9717.\nUniversitas Sebelas Maret, 2019. “UNS Miliki Pusat Bahasa Mandarin,” March 11. Retrieved January 20, 2021 from https://newsroom.uns.ac.id/berita/uns-miliki-pusat-bahasa-mandarin/.\nUniversitas Tanjungpura, 2017. “Kantor Urusan Internasional Universitas Tanjungpura Berkunjung Ke Mahasarakham University Dan Khon Kaen University, Thailand,” Retrieved December 29, 2020 from https://www.untan.ac.id/kantor-urusan-internasional-universitas-tanjungpura-berkunjung-ke-mahasarakham-university-dan-khon-kaen-universi ty-thailand/.\nUniversitas Udayana, 2018. “Unud dan Unhas Resmikan “CTTC” Jalin Kerjasama China,” July 22. Retrieved September 23, 2020 from https://tci.unud.ac.id/posts/unud-dan-unhas-resmikan-cttc-jalin-kerjasama-china.\nUniversitas Udayana, 2019. “Rektor Unud Tandatangani Agreement Pendirian Tourism Confucius Institute (TCI) Udayana University,” December 11. Retrieved April 24, 2020 from https://www.unud.ac.id/en/headline3223--Rektor-Unud-Tandatangani-Agreement-Pendirian-Tourism-Confucius-Institute-TCI-Udayana-University.html.\nUniversitas Udayana, 2020. “Interview of the Candidate of Chinese Teacher at TCI Udayana University,” July 21. Retrieved September 23, 2020 from https://tci.unud.ac.id/posts/ interview-of-the-candidate-of-chinese-teacher-at-tci-udayana-university.\nUniversitas Udayana, 2020. “Background,” Retrieved September 23, 2020 from https://tci.unud.ac.id/pages/view/background.\nUniversitas Udayana, 2021. “The Grand Opening Ceremony of Tourism Confucius Institute (TCI) Udayana University,” April 8. Retrieved April 13, 2021, from https://www.unud.ac. id/en/berita3615-The-Grand-Opening-Ceremony-of-Tourism-Confucius-Institute-TCI-Uda yana-University.html.\nUS-China Institute, 2013. “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” November 12. Retrieved December 10, 2017 from http://china.usc.edu/decision-central-committee-communist-party-china-some-major-issues-concerning-comprehensively.\n\nConfucius Institutes’ Social Media Accounts\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia (@pusatbahasamandarinalazhar). Retrieved December 8, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/pusatbahasamandarin alazhar/.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Hasanuddin (@pbm.unhas). Retrieved September 8, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/pbm.unhas/.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Negeri Malang (@bahasamandarin_um). Retrieved December 2, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/bahasamandarin_um/.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Negeri Surabaya (@ci_unesa). Retrieved December 14, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/ci_unesa/.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Sebelas Maret (@confucius_uns). Retrieved December 30, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/confucius_uns/.\nPusat Bahasa Mandarin Universitas Tanjungpura (@pusatbahasamandarinuntan). Retrieved September 8, 2020 from https://www.instagram.com/pusatbahasamandarinuntan/.\nTourism Confucus Institute at Udayana University. Retrieved January 21, 2021 from https://www.facebook.com/Tourism-Confucius-Institute-Udayana-University-1118452771 77762.
描述: 博士
國立政治大學
亞太研究英語博士學位學程(IDAS)
106265504
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106265504
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
550401.pdf5.49 MBAdobe PDF2View/Open
Show full item record

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.