經營權爭奪下董事會採行防禦措施與董事受託義務之研究

Abstract

探究經營權爭奪本質，涉及公司控制權的更換，除了影響公司整體政策方向與營運方針外，亦牽涉股東權利以及公司利害關係人的權益。而董事在決策過程中的角色至關重要，董事會握有諸多事項的決策權限，其中包括面臨經營權爭奪與非合意併購時，公司是否採行防禦措施，以及應採取何種防禦措施。我國近幾年經營權爭奪案例層出不窮，公司董事會採取之防禦措施包羅萬象，其中不乏欠缺適當性的防禦手段，甚至產生公司間相互模仿的亂象，不利於企業間良性競爭與發展。\n為使董事權責相符，我國公司法對董事設有受託義務的規範，董事於決策時應盡其善良管理人注意義務，且應以公司利益為唯一考量，方符合忠實義務。該規定係屬董事的行為規範，於經營權爭奪與非合意併購時，董事隨時處於高度利益衝突的環境，為避免董事濫用權力，耗費公司資源，藉此鞏固自身經營地位，董事亦須遵循受託義務的要求，否則將對公司負損害賠償責任。\n本文聚焦於經營權爭奪下，目標公司董事會採取防禦措施時，董事是否已善盡其受託義務的爭議。本研究藉由美國法院判例的建構，描繪出董事受託義務的審查架構，並實際以我國實務案例為標的進行分析，冀以提供我國法院未來審查經營權爭奪案件中董事責任的判斷標準，在審查架構明確的前提下，增加兩造使用司法資源解決爭議之意願，杜絕違法防禦手段，達到提升法治環境、維護公司利益與保障股東權利之目的。

The nature of hostile takeover relates to the replacement of corporate right of control. Not only will it affect company’s operational policies, but also influence the rights of shareholders and stakeholders. Board of directors play an important role during the process of hostile takeover. Due to board of directors are the authority to decide whether the company need to operate defensive tactics, and which kind of tactics does the company have to adopt when the company is confronted with hostile takeover. Recent years, hostile takeovers are emerging in an endless stream in our country. Some directors use the defensive tactics which are illegal or illegitimate to consolidate their management；thus, the phenomenon is harmful to promote the positive environment for the companies to compete and develop beneficially.\nIn order to make the directors be responsible to their decisions, the Company Act requires the directors to take responsibilities for fiduciary duties, including the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Under hostile takeover, board of directors are in the situation of highly conflict of interests. To prevent the directors from abusing their power to consolidate their management, the directors have to comply with the fiduciary duty, or they need to compensate the company for causing damages.\nLastly, this thesis focuses on the issues of whether the directors of the target company have fulfilled their fiduciary duties when they decided to adopt defensive tactics under hostile takeover. This research attempt to depict the judicial review of directors’ fiduciary duty via the cases in United States, and analyze on Taiwan’s cases in practice.