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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/137315| 題名: | 資源詛咒？自然資源與內戰 The curse of resources? Natural resources and civil war |
作者: | 李嘉璇 Li, Jia-Syuan |
貢獻者: | 蘇昱璇 Su, Yu-Hsuan 李嘉璇 Li, Jia-Syuan |
關鍵詞: | 自然資源詛咒 內戰 自然資源租金 The curse of natural resources Civil war Rent of natural resources |
日期: | 2021 | 上傳時間: | 1-十月-2021 | 摘要: | 自然資源詛咒，探討為何國家擁有某種大量不可再生的自然資源，理應可以促進國內的經濟成長，帶動國家的發展，卻反而造成經濟增長遲緩、工業化低落、貧富差距、過度依賴單一經濟結構、產業難以轉型、非民主的窘境。本研究假設仰賴自然資源的國家，有較高的機率發生內戰，以自然資源詛咒為理論基礎，研究自然資源租金的多寡和一國的內戰有無關聯，以及如果有關聯，何種自然資源對於內戰的影響最大；並以較長的資料年限，檢視在 Auty 提出理論的二十多年後詛咒是否仍然存在。\n本研究結合世界銀行、政體四計畫以及 UCDP/PRIO 之武裝衝突資料庫數據，建立資料區間 1970-2017 年 193 個國家的追蹤資料，以「國家－年」的數據結構，進行「時間序列與橫斷面資料」與「廣義估計方程式」的分析。為了更精確的將自然資源對於內戰的影響進行詮釋，本研究亦加入三個面向的討論：只考慮有生產自然資源的國家、進行地理分區、排除高收入國家。\n研究結果發現：整體而言自然資源和內戰爆發呈現高度相關，驗證自然資源詛咒理論的存在。在各種自然資源類型中，石油和天然氣對於內戰爆發機率的提高是有顯著影響的，而煤炭與金屬礦產對於內戰爆發機率的影響不大，森林資源與內戰的聯繫甚至有歧異性。此外，不同種類的自然資源對於不同地區均會產生不同的效果。自然資源在各地理區和內戰爆發呈現顯著正相關的分別是：南亞的石油、煤炭、天然氣，歐洲和中亞的石油、天然氣，撒哈拉以南非洲的天然氣，拉丁美洲和加勒比海的石油。東亞和太平洋以及中東和北非各類自然資源對於內戰爆發的影響均不顯著。 The curse of natural resources is a theory discussing why a country has a large amount of non-renewable natural resources, which should promote domestic economic growth and drive the country’s development, but have caused slow economic growth, income inequality, undemocracy, low industrialization, unsuccessful industrial transformation, and the dilemma of over-reliance on a single economic structure. This study assumes that countries that rely on natural resources have a higher probability of civil wars. Based on the curse of natural resources, I explore whether the natural resource rents are related to civil wars onset in a country, and if so, what kind of natural resources will have the largest impact on the civil war. I also use a longer period of data to examine whether the curse still exists more than 20 years after Auty put forward the theory.\nThis study combines data from the World Bank, the Polity IV Project and UCDP/PRIO’s armed conflict database to establish a panel dataset for 193 countries from 1970 to 2017. The data structure of “country-year”" is used to conduct analysis of time series and cross-sectional data using generalized estimation equations. In order to more accurately interpret the impact of natural resources on the civil war, this study adds three aspects of discussion: only consider countries that produce natural resources, carry out geographic divisions, and exclude high-income countries.\nThe results of the study found that natural resources are highly correlated with civil war onset, verifying the existence of the natural resources curse. Oil and natural gas have significant impact on the increase in probability of civil wars, while coal and metal minerals have little effect, and the relationship between forest resources and civil wars are even different in different specifications. In addition, different types of natural resources have different effects in different regions. The following natural resources have significantly positive impact on civil war onset: oil, coal, and natural gas in South Asia; oil and natural gas in Europe and Central Asia; natural gas in sub-Saharan Africa; oil in Latin America and the Caribbean. In East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East and North Africa, the impact of natural resources is not significant. |
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Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2), 366–420. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.366\n\nC. 網路資料\nPolity IV Project, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm\nUppsala Conflict Data Program: UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/\nWorld Bank, https://data.worldbank.org | 描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 國家發展研究所 108261003 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108261003 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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