董事勤勉義務認定標準與商業判斷規則之研究

Abstract

董事勤勉義務要求公司中的管理者應當以適當的注意管理公司以免損害公司利益，其為公司治理中的重要制度，各國針對董事勤勉義務之審查標準不盡相同：英國法經歷了從客觀標準主觀標準再到主客觀相結合的歷程，美國法則通過數個案例以及模範公司法等成文法確立了善意、合理相信為了公司最佳利益兩個主要判斷標準並輔以商業判斷規則以進行審查。2005年，中國大陸修改公司法，引入董事勤勉義務這一概念，在此之前已有行政法規、部門規章等針對上市公司董事的勤勉義務作出了規範，整體立法體系較為混亂且公司法上的規定過於原則性，司法解釋亦給未出較為明確的審查標準。從司法實踐來看，近年來，董事勤勉義務案件持續增加，有不少法院通過個案對勤勉義務作出了解釋，亦有法院引入了商業判斷規則以輔助判斷。本文將在研究董事勤勉義務判斷標準之沿革及商業判斷規則適用路徑之基礎上，分析各國（地區）移植商業判斷規則之路徑，同時針對中國大陸董事勤勉義務立法及司法實踐中存在問題之基礎上，提出兩層次的細化中國大陸勤勉義務路徑，一為建立主客觀相結合的抽象審查標準，二為以司法解釋與指導性案例相結合的成文化形式引入商業判斷規則作為勤勉義務的輔助性審查標準，在適用路徑上做舉證責任的適當轉移，以達成股東、公司利益與董事決策空間之平衡。

Directors` duty of care requires that managers should manage the company with due care so as not to damage the interests of the company. It is an important system in corporate governance. The English law has gone through the process from objective standard to subjective standard to the combination of subjective and objective standard, and the American law has established two main judgments: good faith, reasonable belief in the best interests of the company, supplemented by business judgment rules. In 2005, China revised the Corporation Law to introduce the concept of directors` duty of care. Before that, administrative regulations and departmental rules have regulated the directors` duty of care. The whole legislative system is chaotic and the provisions of the Corporation Law are too principled. Judicial interpretation has not given a clear standard of review. In recent years, the cases of directors` duty of care have been increasing. Many courts have explained the duty of care through individual cases, and some courts have introduced the business judgment rule to assist judgment. This article will analyze the routes of transplanting business judgment rules to various countries (regions) based on the evolution of the judgment criteria for directors` due diligence obligations and the path of application of business judgment rules. In response to the problems in legislation and judicial practice of directors` due diligence obligations in Mainland China, this article proposes two levels of detailed due care obligations of directors in Mainland China. One is to establish an abstract review standard combining subjectivity and objectivity, and the other is to introduce business judgment rules as a supplementary review standard through a cultural combination of judicial interpretations and guiding cases. In this way, the burden of proof is appropriately transferred to balance the interests of shareholders and companies as well as the decision-making space of directors.