Gettier式思想實驗兩難之解消方案

Abstract

筆者在〈論Gettier式思想實驗的兩難〉一文中主張，對Gettier式思想實驗持傳統觀點的哲學家，會面臨一個兩難。本文的目的在於解消這個兩難。更精確地說，這個兩難的一個核心主張是，Gettier式思想實驗可以作為知識理論的反例，只有當「必然論」（necessitism）是不成立的。本文提出一個嶄新的論證，替必然論回應上述的批評。

In ＂On a Dilemma of the Gettier-style thought experiments＂, I argue that the traditional view on the Gettier-style thought experiments will give rise to a dilemma. This paper aims at dissolving this dilemma. More exactly, the crux of a horn of the dilemma consists in denying a view called ＂necessitism＂. In this paper, I offer a novel argument defending necessitism.