恩庇侍從與香港自由專制之破局

Abstract

中共自過渡期開始，一直在香港經營統一戰線以建立管治聯盟，將不同界別、階層、來源的精英和社會領袖納入其網絡之中。自2003年以降，中共投放大量資源到香港，在基層建立各層綿密的恩庇侍從網絡（clientelist network），主要功能之一是在各級選舉中建立龐大的動員機器以支持政權，令在有限民主的立法會選舉中，支持政權的力量可以穩占立法會及選舉委員會的多數。本文將從恩從關係的理論出發，討論中共如何透過利益投放，建立多層的互相配合的利益網絡，配合不同選舉模式（功能界別選舉、立法會直選和區議會選舉），在近年的選舉中逐漸擴大其群眾支持基礎。2019年香港的反送中運動帶來的民意海嘯，令民主派大舉攻陷八成多的區議會議席，對中共這個恩庇策略做成挫折，亦影響中共控制立法會選舉和未來特首選舉的能力，但網絡的基本票源穩固。區議會選舉的大敗，間接促使中共以非常手段以人大為香港立國家安全法，以及在2021年由人大出手根本地改變香港的選舉制度，做成本來「自由專制」和「一國兩制」的賽局被破壞。

Since 1997, the Chinese government has been trying to manage a liberal autocracy in Hong Kong. Liberal institutions are allowed to co-exist with an autocratic system that does not allow popular election of the government. The Chinese government carefully engineers a multi-layered patron-client network by cooptation of the business and professional elites by the electoral system, to ensure that they can control the majority in both the Legislative Council and the Election Committee. At the grassroot level, the pro-Beijing camp injected a lot of resources after 2003 to build up a massive patron-client network which becomes a formidable mobilizational machine. This brought the pro-Beijing forces great success in local District Council elections since 2007, and has led to a gradual increase of the pro-government vote since then. The political repercussions of the 2019 anti-extradition movement brought a landslide victory for the Hong Kong democrats in the District Council elections. It marked a severe setback for the patron-client strategy of the pro-Beijing camp, and also indirectly led to the drastic move of enacting the National Security Law for Hong Kong. Furthermore, the imposition of the changes to the Hong Kong electoral system in 2021 altered the ＂liberal autocracy＂ game plan for China. The scrapping of the ＂liberal autocracy＂ game plan brings severe damage to the reputation of Hong Kong as a free city, and at the same time, removes the limited fair elections of Hong Kong.