由交易成本理論探討日本「空降」現象-以自民黨、民主黨政權下的改革為例

Abstract

日本官僚的空降（天下り）現象由來已久，對經濟成長期的日本來說，空降曾是官僚有效指導民間企業並彈性調整政策方向的手段，也是對畢生奉獻為國的官僚們所提供的合理報酬。但在日本經濟陷入停滯，官僚更陸續爆出貪瀆醜聞之後，民眾遂逐漸對空降現象產生反感。\n本文從交易成本理論的觀點來探討空降現象，亦即將空降現象的人材媒合機制，視為一種市場上的交易行為。並從交易的三項特徵：交易頻率、資產專屬性、不確定性來探討日本的官僚制度、政黨政治、官民關係是如何影響空降的盛衰，並以宏觀的角度，透過空降人數、退休年齡等相關數據來評斷歷屆政權的改革是否能有效改善空降現象。同時亦從個案分析的角度，舉警察廳空降的態樣來具體剖析官僚與企業間空降體系的運作情形。\n研究發現，即便經過自民、民主兩黨歷任政權的改革，整體空降人數卻不減反增。鑒於退休官僚在求職市場上具有「特殊人力資本」特徵，企業也傾向建立與官僚關係發展的專屬性投資，政府改革空降不應期待官僚於求職之際主動放棄其資產專屬性的優勢，而應著重在降低求職行為本身的交易頻率，使官僚們退休後的經濟生活得到保障。

“Amakudari” is a time-honoured phenomenon in Japan between civil servants. It is an effective way for civil servants used to give private enterprises guidance and more flexible in adjusting government policy, and also as a reasonable reward for civil servants that dedicated themselves to the country. However, as Japan not only suffered from the recession but also outbreaks of many corruption scandals, people are gradually dissatisfied with Amakudari.\nThis paper applies transaction cost theory to discuss the Amakudari phenomenon and it means that the Amakudari‘s talent recruit mechanism would be regarded as a transaction in the free market. The author elaborated on the influence of how bureaucracy, party politics and relationship between government and public made in Amakudari by Frequency of exchange, Asset specificity and Uncertainty. Through statistical data such as the number of people of Amakudari and retirement age to judge whether reforms from The Liberal Democratic Party regime and The Democratic Party regime are effective or not and take the National Police Agency’s Amakudari for example to explain how Amakudari works between civil servants and private enterprises from both perspectives of micro and macro levels.\nThe results showed that through the reforms by both The Liberal Democratic Party regime and The Democratic Party regime, the number of people of Amakudari has increased instead of decreasing. Because retired civil servants have characteristics of “special human capital” on the job market, private enterprises tend to develop Relationship-specific investments（RSI）with those civil servants. The government of Japan should not expect that civil servants will give up their advantage of Asset specificity voluntarily, instead, it should decrease the Frequency of exchange of job hunting and ensure their retirement lives are secured.