目標國的全球化程度對經濟制裁結果的影響，1992~2005

Abstract

在武力使用較受限制的當代國際社會，經濟制裁便成為國家之間處理衝突議題的重要政策工具之一。在互賴程度較高的國家之間，彼此之間或至少其中一方將因為比對方有較低的敏感性與脆弱性而擁有制裁槓桿，而近年來全球化的進展更加深了國家與國家之間的互賴關係，那麼，全球化對於經濟制裁的影響又是如何呢？本文的目的，即在於探究目標國在「政治」、「經濟」和「社會」這三個不同面向上的全球化程度，對於其在被單一國家威脅或是實際執行經濟制裁之後是否會讓步所產生的影響。根據相關文獻的建議，本文的論點預期，當目標國的「對外政治連結」程度愈高時，基於「目標國可能受到實質多邊制裁的程度愈低」、「目標國可能得到的外部支持程度愈高」、「目標國與發起國之間的敵意程度愈高的可能性愈大」以及「政治因素的影響方向較為穩定」等四大理由，因此在發起國對目標國發出制裁威脅或者是實際執行經濟制裁的時候，目標國的對外「政治連結」程度愈高，則其做出讓步的機率將會愈低。且因為這四大理由並未能在目標國的對外「經濟連結」關係和對外「社會連結」關係中穩定出現，因此目標國的對外「經濟連結」程度和對外「社會連結」程度對其做出讓步的機率並沒有顯著的影響。本文以後冷戰時期全球的經濟制裁事件為樣本，從 1992∼2005 年這一段期間的經驗證據支持了本文的論點。本文的發現對於目前的兩岸關係也具有重要的啟示。

In contemporary international society where the use of force is largely restricted, economic sanctions are an important policy tool when states deal with conflicts between themselves and other states. Among those states with high levels of interdependence, at least one or both sides will have sanctioning leverage due to lower sensitivity and vulnerability. In addition, recent developments in globalization have further enhanced the interdependence between nations. Subsequently, what influence will globalization have on economic sanctions? The goal of this research is to explore the impact of the degree of globalization of the target states on their “political connections,” “economic connections,” and “social connections” when a single state either threatens to implement or implements economic sanctions directed toward them. The previous findings suggest that the stronger the political connections that the target states have, the less likely they will be substantively cut off, the more likely they will be able to receive external support, and the more likely that the senders and targets will be highly antagonistic towards each other. However, the economic and social connections between target states and other countries do not have the same effects as their political connections. Besides, the causal directions of target states’ political connections are much more stable than those of the economic and social connections. Therefore, the target states that have stronger political connections will have a lower probability of making concessions when threatened or when the sanctions imposed by the sender state are actually enforced. By contrast, the level of their economic or social connections will not be significantly affected regardless of whether they concede or not. Empirical evidence based on the post-Cold War economic sanctions from 1992 to 2005 supports this argument. The findings of this research also have important policy implications for current Cross-Strait relations.