壽險業資本監理及監管干預之有效性分析

Abstract

我國現行資本監理制度為風險資本額制度(Risk Based Capital, RBC)，為與國際接軌將於 2026 年正式實施保險資本標準(Insurance Capital Standards, ICS)，該制度在風險分類、資產負債評價方式、適格資本認定及風險資本計算均與 RBC 制度有重大差異。本研究整理 RBC 與 ICS 之差異，並分析未來壽險業應如何調整經營策略。研究結果顯示因我國在 ICS 制度下屬於新興市場，國內投資標的風險資本將大幅提升，若主管機關未針對 ICS 進行在地化調整，會引導壽險業投資更多於國外固定收益資產，而因適格資本認定和風險資本計提標準更為嚴格，預期壽險業整體資本適足率將會大幅下降。\n此外，當壽險公司不符合監理標準時，主管機關會採取監理干預措施，故本文透過監理干預效用模型以現時經濟環境和台灣壽險業資料進行實證分析， 研究不同監理干預措施對壽險公司資產配置和保單持有人效用的影響。實證結果顯示:(1) 同時採行限縮風險性投資和增資兩項監理干預措施對保單持有人的效用最高，而加入國外資產可以增加保單持有人效用。(2) 保單合約期間越長， 保單預定利率越高，保單持有人效用越高，而監理干預標準提升和壽險公司負債佔資產比例越高，會降低保單持有人效用。

In 2026, the Insurance Capital Standard (ICS) is expected to be implemented in Taiwan. Compared to the existing RBC framework, ICS presents four main differences, including risk classifications, assets and liabilities valuation, qualifying capital resources and method for calculating the capital requirement. This paper first analyzes the differences between RBC and ICS framework, and then discusses how life insurers would redesign their business strategies due to the changes in the regulatory regime. This paper concludes that since the capital market in Taiwan had been classified as an emerging market under ICS framework, lacking in local adaptation, the capital standard would give life insurers incentives to allocate more assets in foreign fixed income instruments. Also, as risk charges and qualifying capital resources are calibrated to stricter criteria, a substantial drop in capital adequacy ratio can be expected.\nFurthermore, to investigate how regulatory intervention affects life insurers and policyholders, this paper proposes an empirical study by using utility model. The results can be summarized in two critical views:(1) Regulatory measure combining investment constraints and capital injection seems more efficient in terms of increasing the benefits of policyholders. Besides, including foreign instruments can increase policyholder’s benefits. (2) Longer term of contract and higher guaranteed interest rate result in higher policyholder’s benefits, while higher regulatory intervention threshold and debt ratio lead to lower policyholder’s benefits.