替代能源直購市場創建對生產效率影響

Abstract

本文利用賽局理論替台灣替代能源市場建立新的直購電拍賣機制，過往拍賣機制在設定時假設廠商皆採取不合作策略，但現實世界廠商確會優先採取合作策略，若未排除廠商間合作可能將造成市場損失。而透過本研究建立的單邊英式拍賣機制，可以排除廠商間合作可能性，並且該機制透過Revelation Principle，誘使廠商誠實出價，在競爭均衡狀況下將使社會利益最大化。本文亦透過現有資料模擬台灣與世界各國參與該直購電拍賣機制後，找到台灣最好的合作夥伴。因此本文創建了一個相對完善的直購電拍賣機制，有利於推進台灣碳中和。

This article studies the formation of direct purchase of clean energy in an English auction mechanism. Conventional wisdom tells us that suppliers tend to collude to bid prices larger than their respective production costs in order to enjoy the committed joint monopoly profits as is similarly realized in the current devised market. This research; thus, proposes four different kinds of market setups to deduce the market equilibrium with the highest collusion threshold (the patient parameter). The result shows that the tight market supply setup with every supplier indispensable would be the case of the highest collusion threshold. The theoretical result can also be applied to the empirical data to elucidate that the market integration with similar suppliers across different areas would be a more effective way to ease potential collusions.