Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/20194
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creator林繼文zh_TW
dc.creatorLin, Jih-Wen-
dc.date2003-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-30T06:42:22Z-
dc.date.available2008-12-30T06:42:22Z-
dc.date.issued2008-12-30T06:42:22Z-
dc.identifier.urihttps://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/20194-
dc.description.abstractThis article attempts to explain the formation of Taiwan’s opposition coalition, a phenomenon of critical importance to the unfolding of her democratic politics. Seeing the case as a multi-stage coalition formation game, the analysis shows that an electoral alliance between the opposition parties can be engineered regardless of how they interact in the legislature-as long as the cohesion of their legislative partnership is based on the expectation that they will cooperate in the upcoming presidential election. Another main argument is that the key to a successful opposition alliance in the 2004 presidential election hinges on the ability to produce a profile of divisible goods for the election. Once ready, these goods must be allocated in proportion to the electoral strength of each party. The greatest obstacle for the pan-Blue parties to build a joint campaign team may lie in the fact that the People First Party (PFP) has a better chance to deliver a viable candidate; the party is weaker however than the Kuomintang (KMT) in organizational and financial resources.-
dc.formatapplication/en_US
dc.languageenen_US
dc.languageen-USen_US
dc.language.isoen_US-
dc.relationIssues and Studies,39(2),41-72en_US
dc.subjectTaiwan politics ; electoral competition ; coalition formation ; “nested game” ; Kuomintang (KMT) ; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ; People First Party (PFP)-
dc.titleA Blue Tango: Electoral Competition and the Formation of Taiwan`s Opposition Coalitionen_US
dc.typearticleen
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.languageiso639-1en_US-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.openairetypearticle-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
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