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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22314
題名: | Bonding Shirking and Adverse Selection | 作者: | 林忠正 | 關鍵詞: | Shirking;Adverse selection;Bonding;Labor quality;Externalities | 日期: | May-2004 | 上傳時間: | 6-Jan-2009 | 摘要: | The most serious theoretical difficulty regarding shirking-type efficiency wage models is that the introduction of the so-called bonding scheme eliminates involuntary unemployment. This paper develops a shirking-adverse selection model where the resulting key feature is that labor quality within an individual firm negatively depends on the average amount of bonds in the market. Under this situation, a larger bond required by an individual firm will lower the firm`s labor quality and will discourage it from bonding its employees to the limit. This adverse selection problem gives rise to the possibility that bonding cannot eventually eliminate involuntary unemployment. Moreover, a larger bond required by a firm also worsens the labor quality within all other firms (negative externalities). The presence of these negative externalities implies that the profit-maximizing size of bonds required by individual firms in the market may be too large from the viewpoint of social welfare. This opens a possible role for bonding legislation to achieve an equilibrium Pareto superior to the competitive equilibrium. | 關聯: | Economic Modelling,21(3),545-560 | 資料類型: | article |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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