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Title: Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby
Authors: 王智賢;古慧雯;陳添枝
Wang, Jue-Shyan;Koo, Hui-wen;Chen, Tain-Jy
Keywords: Trade protection;Resource allocation;Auction
Date: 2006-12
Issue Date: 2009-01-06 15:23:56 (UTC+8)
Abstract: We present a two-sector model to depict the determination of trade preference. The model highlights lobby as a rivalry between sectors in competition for resources where the outcome of the lobby race is determined by each sector’s ability to generate rent at a given welfare cost to the general population. We investigate the relation between the structure of trade protection and the resource endowment.
Relation: Japan and the World Economy,18(4),488-511
Data Type: article
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