Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22323
題名: Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby
作者: 王智賢;古慧雯;陳添枝
Wang, Jue-Shyan ; \r\nKoo, Hui-wen ; \r\nChen, Tain-Jy
關鍵詞: Trade protection; \r\nResource allocation; \r\nAuction
日期: 十二月-2006
上傳時間: 6-一月-2009
摘要: We present a two-sector model to depict the determination of trade preference. The model highlights lobby as a rivalry between sectors in competition for resources where the outcome of the lobby race is determined by each sector’s ability to generate rent at a given welfare cost to the general population. We investigate the relation between the structure of trade protection and the resource endowment.
關聯: Japan and the World Economy,18(4),488-511
資料類型: article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2004.12.003
Appears in Collections:期刊論文

Files in This Item:
File SizeFormat
29.pdf325.78 kBAdobe PDF2View/Open
Show full item record

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric

Altmetric


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.